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The Dean Reports
The photograph on the cover of
this issue of In Brief illustrates in a
concrete way the scholarly achieve
ment of our faculty. Taken together,
that scholarship forms a body of
work that has made a significant
contribution to legal thought and to
the profession. I hope that our
alumni and friends are proud of the
achievements represented by this
scholarship and understand how
important it is that we continue and
expand this work.
It is easy to see the product of our
scholarship in concrete terms—
weight, volumes, or footnotes. What
is more difficult to see is its impact
and meaning within the profession
and academic life. As a salute to our
faculty's scholarly accomplishments
and aspirations, I would like to talk
about the role that I believe scholar
ship plays.
Our profession is one that thrives
on thought and creativity. Indeed,
there are few other professions
where the life of the mind is called
upon as the main ingredient of the
final product. Our dependence on
our ideas as well as on our ideals
makes our profession one in which
academic scholarship and writing are
absolutely central.
Moreover, in our information age it
is indispensable that we gather, syn
thesize, and disseminate information
in a meaningful and timely manner.
Computers may link us together and
feed our information appetite, but it
is still the human mind that provides
the wisdom that harnesses the energy
of the computer age.
Although it is sometimes said that
there is tension between scholarship
and teaching, that tension is more
illusory than real. Quality scholarship
and teaching both take time. Both
take energy. Both take creativity. But
they work together. The best teaching
is that which is infused with new
ideas and insights. If we expect our
graduates to lead the bench and bar,
we must make sure that our students
are stimulated to examine old ques
tions in new ways and to understand
new ideas through traditional frame
works. At its best, scholarship sup
ports this ideal. Although there are
some who may be able to expound
great thoughts or derive new theo
rems without setting pencil to paper,
for most of us the discipline of writ
ing is itself a process of testing, dis
covery, and enlightenment. The dia
logue with oneself, once on the
yellow pad and now on the video
screen, is the best way of ensuring
that the ideas that are brought to the
classroom are fully blossoming.

Nor is there an inevitable tension
between academic writing and writ
ing that is relevant to the profession.
Like the practice of law, academic
writing comes in boxes of different
sizes and shapes, with a variety of
wrapping paper 'and ribbons. Some
academic writing is directly relevant
to the profession and is consulted
frequently. Legal treatises and trial
practice manuals are pulled from the
shelves fairly often. Outlines for
continuing education lectures are
often precursors of more elaborate
and detailed scholarship. Yet even
scholarship that is thought to be
"esoteric," that is hardly ever pulled
from the shelves, is an important
ingredient in the profession. Thought
shapes the law, and whether read by
several or by many, and whether
used today or stored away as a
resource for tomorrow, thought con
tained in scholarship provides the
creative energy by which the law is
moved and transformed.
We are reminded of this by the
recent visit of Judge Richard A.
Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals. His academic writing was
of the most theoretical, paradigmatic
kind. Few lawyers faced with closing
a deal or trying a personal injury case
would have pulled one of his works
from the shelf for assistance. Yet
Judge Posner's academic writing has
had a profound impact on the shape
of the law and thus on the life of the
practitioner. Even had he not been
appointed to the bench, the influence
of his scholarship would be perva
sive.
Although we cannot all aspire to
that kind of influence, it is not idle to
suggest that over time the ideas ema
nating from this law school have a
positive impact on the profession.
Most important, scholarship is part of
our job. It is legal academics who
have the time for reflection. It is legal
academics who are freed from the
constraints of representing a client or
billing another hour. It is, therefore,
academics who have the responsibil
ity to use the resources available to
them for the production of ideas.
All of these thoughts about scholar
ship also have a practical side. Our
quality is measured in many ways,
from various perspectives. As a train
ing ground for new legal talent, we
depend on the reputation of our fac
ulty to attract the best students from
around the country. We also depend
on their reputation to attract the best
minds from other law schools to our
faculty and to attract the many distin
guished visitors who come to our law
school. Our reputation depends in
large part on judgments by other

academics, and their judgments are
significantly influenced by the quality
and amount of faculty scholarship.
Quality scholarship is not simply a
matter of individual faculty mem
bers' doing their own thing. It is a
collegial endeavor to which we have
an institutional commitment. Colle
gial scholarship is supported by fac
ulty workshops in which faculty
members and invited speakers
present their work in progress in an
informal setting; through these dis
cussions the faculty are exposed to a
range of ideas, and ideas are exposed

to different critical points of view.
Our faculty routinely exchange drafts
of articles for comment and criticism.
We are developing an ethos of collegiality in which we each have an inter
est in, and a stake in, each other's
work.
In addition to nurturing each oth
er's scholarly efforts, we are invigo
rated by visitors from outside our
walls: teachers from other law
schools, scholars in related disci
plines, guest lecturers, practitioners,
Judges, government officials. Ours is
a rich intellectual life. The Sumner
Canary lectures and the Halle visiting
scholars program are only its most
visible manifestations. No week goes
by without at least one visiting
speaker or panel, and often there are
several. I had heard of the reputation
that the Law School has for the range
and depth of its lecture series and its
extra-curricular programs, but I had
to be here to see the excitement that
all of this brings to legal scholarship
and the study of law.
Moreover, the annual conferences
sponsored by the Canada-United
States Law Institute and the LawMedicine Center add considerably to
our intellectual life. These confer
ences promote and subsidize scholar
ship by bringing the best minds
together to bear on a topic of current

interest, and then publishing the
proceedings so that others, also, can
benefit from their exchange of ideas.
Our institutional commitment to
faculty scholarship is shown by our
summer research grants and by our
support of student research assis
tants. As resources become available,
I want to expand this support by
giving student assistants more visibil
ity and higher pay, and by giving
selected faculty reduced teaching
loads when they are undertaking
particularly important and demand
ing research projects. Quality
research is time consuming and thus
expensive. Yet we can do ourselves
no greater favor than to support the
work of our faculty that will earn us
national distinction.
I hope that our alumni and friends
share my pride in our faculty's con
tributions to the profession. I look
forward to reporting periodically in
these pages on our continued pro
gress in scholarship, which will mean
an ever-stronger reputation for the
Law School and a future that is
bright indeed.
—Peter M. Gerhart
Dean

Legal Formalism, Legal Realism,
and the Interpretation of Statutes
and the Constitution-Excerpts
by Richard A. Posner
On October 15, 1986, Judge Richard
A. Posner, formerly of the University of
Chicago law faculty and now of the
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh
Circuit, spent a day at the Law School
as Sumner Canary Lecturer. He deliv
ered his address in the Hostetler Moot
Courtroom to an audience of students,
law faculty, and invited guests.
Here are some excerpts from Judge
Posner's speech. They are taken from
his preliminary remarks where he
explained what he was going to say. For
the meat of his talk, actual examples of
his application of his theory of statutory
and constitutional interpretation, you
will have to wait for the publication of
Volume 37, Number 2, of the Case
Western Reserve Law Review. (There
you will also find complete footnotes,
here omitted.) It will not be too long a
wait. That issue is scheduled to appear
in February.

Formalism and
Realism Defined
The terms "legal formalism" and
"legal realism" have a long history in
legal thought, and over the years
have accreted so many meanings and
valences that, surpassing even "judi
cial self-restraint" and "judicial activ
ism," each has become an all-purpose
term both of approbation and of
disapprobation. "Formalist" can
mean narrow, conservative, hypocrit
ical, resistant to change, casuistic,
descriptively inaccurate (that is,
"unrealistic" in the ordinary-language
sense of the word), ivory-towered,
fallacious, callow, authoritarian—but
also rigorous, modest, reasoned,
faithful, self-denying, restrained.
"Realist" can mean cynical, reduc
tionist, manipulative, hostile to law,
political, left-wing, epistemologically

naive—but also progressive, humane,
candid, mature, clear-eyed. These
usages reflect the polemical character
of so much writing about law. "Legal
realism" is also used to refer to the
work of specific academic lawyers
mainly on the Yale and Columbia
faculties during the 1920s and 1930s
and specific (and diverse) ideas held
by those men, and "formalism" to
refer to the judges and academic
lawyers whom the "legal realists"
attacked and who attacked the real
ists in turn.
I want to use "formalism" in a
precise sense that is related but not
identical to the "formalism" of
Langdell and the other nineteenthcentury American legal formalists. I
want to use it to mean the use of
deductive logic to derive the outcome
of a case from premises accepted as
authoritative. Used as a mode of

evaluating judicial decisions, formal
ism enables the observer to pro
nounce the outcome of the case cor
rect or incorrect, in the same way
that the solution to a mathematical
problem can be pronounced correct
or incorrect. By "realism" I mean
deciding a case so that its outcome
best promotes public welfare in nonlegalistic terms; it is policy analysis.
A "realist" decision is more likely to
be Judged sound or unsound than
correct or incorrect, the latter pair of
words suggesting a more demonstra
ble, verifiable mode of analysis than
will usually be possible in weighing
considerations of policy. Such equity
maxims as "No person shall profit
from his own wrongdoing," which
Professor Dworkin calls "principles,"
are in my analysis policy consider
ations.
My definitions of "formalism" and
"realism" enable these terms to be
used descriptively rather than evaluatively, and precisely rather than
vaguely. One can speak of good and
bad formalism, and good and bad
realism. But—and this is the impor
tant point—one can use "formalism"
and "realism" as I have defined them
only in discussing common law. The
common law has a logical structure,
and its premises are determined by
notions of public policy. Statutes and
constitutions are fundamentally dif
ferent. They are communications;
and neither logic nor policy is the
key to decoding them (unless the
communication, when decoded, is
discovered to be saying to the courts,
"Make common law"). This distinc
tion, which is central to this paper,
has now to be explained.

Formalism, Realism,
and the Common Law
The common law (which I use
broadly to mean all legitimately
judge-made law) is a collection of
concepts, such as negligence, consid
eration, possession, good faith, con
spiracy, impossibility, and laches,
which furnish major premises for the
decision of cases; the minor premises
are the facts of the case. The model
is "All men are mortal; Socrates is a
man; therefore Socrates is mortal."
The major premise is a concept or
definition, the minor premise a fac
tual statement. So if an enforceable
contract is a promise supported by
consideration, and Als-promise to B
was supported by consideration, the
promise is a contract. Of course the
syllogistic structure of a real case is
more complicated (what with
defenses, exceptions, etc.), but that
no more affects my analysis than the
fact that some mathematical prob
lems are harder than others.
Obviously the choice of premises is
critical, and that is where public
2

Judge Posner, whose predecessors as Sumner
Canary Lecturers have included (thenj Chief
Justice Warren Earl Burger and Associate
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, is often
mentioned as a probable appointee to the
United States Supreme Court. A graduate of
Yale University, he took his law degree at
Harvard, where he was president of the Law
Review. He went on to a year's Supreme
Court clerkship, with Justice Brennan, and
thence into government service—first with the
Federal Trade Commission, then the
Office of Solicitor General, and finally
(before entering the academic world)
President Johnson's Task Force on
Communications Policy.

policy comes in. Why enforce only
promises supported by consideration,
or only promises that are consciously
accepted? The reason, if it is a good
reason, has to be traceable to some
notion of policy rather than just be
the result of arbitrary personal pref
erences or antipathies, or class bias,
or some other thoroughly discredited
ground of judicial action. It can't be
logic. You use logic to go from the
premises to the conclusion, not to
obtain the premises. Of course, a
premise may be the result of deduc
tion from some more basic premise.
But eventually one is forced back to a
premise that cannot be obtained or
proved by deduction. The nineteenthcentury formalists sometimes over
looked (or perhaps deliberately cpncealed) this point. Since the choice of
premises on grounds of policy is
usually more iffy than the deduction
of a conclusion from iti premises, the
formalists preferred to focus on the
process of deduction rather than on
the process of choosing their prem
ises. They liked to give the impres
sion that the premises were selfevident—meanwhile packing as much
into the major premises as possible,
to shorten the chain of deductions.
The result is a kind of nominalism, or
conceptualism, or Platonism: the idea
that concepts exist "out there," like
trees or rocks, rather than are cre
ated.

Thus Langdell said that a person
who returns a lost article for which
the owner has offered a reward has
no contractual right to the reward if
he didn't know about the offer,
because then the act of return could
not have been a conscious acceptance
of the offer. Langdell's ground was
that since there is no contract with
out such acceptance, the owner's
failure to honor his promise would
not be a breach of contract. But, in so
reasoning, Langdell was treating the
concept of contract as if it were a
thing which couldn't be altered with
out becoming something different. If
you take the legs off a table (I mean
permanently—not just for storage or
moving), it is no longer a table. But it
doesn't follow that if you don't have
an acceptance you don't have a con
tract. A contract is just a promise that
courts enforce, and if there is a good
reason of policy for doing so they can
decide to enforce a promise even
though it was not "accepted" because
the promisee didn't know about the
promise. The question for the court
should be (putting aside the issue of
adherence to precedent): ought the
unconscious acceptance be deemed to
create a contract? The answer should
depend, I would think, on whether, if
it is, more lost articles will be
returned, at an acceptable cost to the
legal system—a difficult question, as
it happens.
*

Holmes mounted a series of fierce
realist attacks on Langdell's formal
ism, insisting that the law was not a
set of preexisting concepts of fixed
scope but a tool of government which
would and should be reshaped as the
desires of the community or (more
realistically) its politically dominant
groups changed. He made the point
in his most memorable academic
aphorism ("The life of the law has
not been logic; it has been experi
ence") and in his famous definition of
law as a prophecy of what the judges
would do when confronted with a
given set of facts. The definition is
incomplete. It is not usable by the
judges of the highest court in the
jurisdiqtion, or even by the judges of
the lower courts in the absence of
clear precedent on the question at
issue on personal knowledge of their
judicial superiors' views on it. Never
theless it is significant in pointing us ,
away from concepts as the defining
characteristic of law.
But despite much derision by
Holmes of formal logic (the syllogism
can't wag its tail, and so forth), there
is no inconsistency between realism
in Holmes's sense and formalism in
the sense of deductive reasoning.
Once the basic premises are chosen
on realist grounds (e.g., once the rule
of capture is given a scope cotermi

nous with its economic rationale),
deduction can proceed without violat
ing realist norms.
»!
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The modern exemplar of formalism
in common law is the positive eco
nomic analysis of the common law
that Professor Landes and I and oth
ers have expounded. Taking as our
premise the claim that the common
law seeks to promote efficiency in
the sense of wealth maximization
(that is, abstracting from distributive
considerations), plus certain informa
tion about technology and human
behavior, we deduce a set of optimal
common law doctrines and institu
tions and then compare them with
the actual common law. I mean
deduction in a literal sense. Eco
nomic theory is a logical system like
calculus or geometry (hence eco
nomic theory can be and often is
expressed mathematically), or more
precisely a family of such systems. If
the positive economic theory of the
common law is right, the common
law is a logical system; and deductive
logic—formal reasoning—can be used
to reach demonstrably correct results
in particular cases, or to demonstrate
the correctness of results in particu
lar cases. Provided, of course, that
our major premise (that of wealth
maximization), along with a bunch of
minor premises, is accepted. Whether
it is or is not belongs to the realm of
policy analysis; it is the realist com
ponent of the economic theory of the
common law. It is realist because we
assume that the concepts which pro
vide the major premises for common
law reasoning (whether an overarch
ing premise such as wealth maximi
zation, or particular legal concepts
such as negligence that can be
deduced from it) can be and are
altered by the judges in accordance
with changing perceptions of public
policy. Of course the pace of change
is affected by the need to preserve a
reasonable degree of stability in law,
but this is just another policy consid
eration.
The essence of common law is that
the law itself is made by the judges.
They are the legislators. They create
(modify, etc.) the doctrines of the
common law, from which further
doctrines are deduced, and the entire
doctrinal structure then supplies
major premises and the trial process
the minor ones (the facts), thus
enabling case outcomes to be pro
duced by a deductive method. The
actuality is far, far messier, in part
because a number of minor premises
involving motivation, information,
etc. are contested, but the nature and
direction of the process are clear
enough to suggest the utility of the
terms "legal formalism" and "legal
realism," as I have defined them, in

analyzing common law decision
making.

The Nature of Textual
Interpretation:
Decoding
Communications
The major premise of a syllogism is
always in the nature of a definition
(like "All men are mortal"), or what
is the same thing, a rule (e.g., the
perfect-tender rule), or what is again
the same thing, a concept (e.g., negli
gence, which stated as a rule or defi
nition is "All persons are prima facie
liable for accidents resulting from
their failure to take due care, i.e., the
cost-justified level of care"). The
common law, like the system of real
numbers, is a conceptual system—not
a textual system. The concept of
negligence, of consideration, or of
reliance, etc. is not tied to a particu
lar verbal formulation, but can be
restated in whatever form of words
seems clearest in light of current
linguistic conventions, etc. Common
law thus is unwritten law in a pro
found sense. There are more or less
influential statements of every doc
trine, but none is authoritative in the
sense that the decision of a new case
must be tied to the statement, rather
than to the concept of which the
statement is one of an indefinite
number of possible formulations.
Statutory and constitutional law
differs fundamentally from common
law in that every statute and consti
tutional provision—the starting point
for decision, and in that respect (but
that respect only) corresponding to a
common law concept—is in some
important sense not to be revised by
the judges. The judges cannot treat
the statute as a stab at formulating a
concept which they are free to
rewrite in their own words. This
might seem just to entail that formal
ist reasoning in statutory or constitu
tional law would be deduction from a
text and would therefore be possible
as long as the text was as precise as a
common law concept. But there is no
such thing as deduction from a text.
No matter how clear the text seems,
it must be interpreted (or decoded)
like any other communication, and
interpretation is neither logical
deduction nor policy analysis. The
terms "formalism" and "realism" as I
have defined them thus have no
application to statutory or constitu
tional law, except, as I have said,
when the framers' command is sim
ply that the judges go out and make
common law.
A conclusion obtained by deduction
is already contained in the premises
in the sense that the only materials
used to obtain the conclusion are the
premises themselves and the rules of
logic. But meaning cannot be

extracted from a text merely by tak
ing the language of the text and
applying the rules of logic to it. All
sorts of linguistic and cultural tools
must be brought to bear on even the
simplest-seeming text to get meaning
out of it. This is not to suggest that
all texts are ambiguous. A text is
clear if all or most persons having the
linguistic and cultural competence
assumed by the authors of the text
would agree on its meaning. Most
texts are clear in this sense, which is
the only sense that captures the
meaning of the word "clear" as
applied to texts.
Hi
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The idea of legislation as communi
cation may seem to have no utility
beyond showing the fatuity and con
fusion of applying the terms "legal
formalism" and "legal realism" to the
interpretation of legislation. For most
of the time it is impossible to ask the
legislature to repeat an unclear mes
sage. But by considering what the
possible responses are to an unclear
message when the sender cannot be
queried about his intended meaning,
we shall see that the notion of legisla
tion as communication has consider
able utility. One possible response of
the receiver is to ignore the message,
and this might seem the appropriate
posture for a court faced with an
enactment whose meaning with
respect to the case at hand cannot be
deciphered. Yet that kind of response
can be profoundly unresponsive.
Suppose the commander of the lead
platoon in an attack finds his way
blocked by an unexpected enemy
pillbox. He has two choices: go
straight ahead at the pillbox, or try to
bypass it to the left. He radios the
company commander for instruc
tions. The commander replies,
"Go—"; but the rest of the message is
garbled, and when the platoon com
mander radios back for clarification,
he is unable to get through. If the
platoon commander decides that, not
having received or being able to get
an intelligible command, he should
do nothing until communications can
be reestablished, his decision would
probably be wrong. For it is plain
from the part of the message that
was received that the company com
mander wanted him to get by the
enemy pillbox, either by frontal
attack or by bypassing it, and it is
likely that the company commander
would have preferred the platoon
commander to decide by himself
which course to follow rather than to
do nothing and let the attack fail. At
all events, for the platoon com
mander to take the position that he
can do nothing, just because the
communication was garbled, would
be an irresponsible "interpretation."
The situation with regard to legisla
tive interpretation is analogous. In

our system of government the fram
ers of statutes and constitutions are
the superiors of the judges. The fram
ers communicate orders to the judges
through legislative texts (including, of
course, the Constitution). If the
orders are clear, the judges must obey
them. Often, however, because of
passage of time and change of cir
cumstance the orders are unclear,
and normally the judges cannot
query the framers to find out what
the order means. The judges are thus
like the platoon commander in my
example. And it seems to me not a
responsible discharge of their func
tion to take the position that if the
orders are unclear, they will refuse to
act. They are part of an organization,
an enterprise—in the case of federal
judges, the enterprise of governing
the United States—and when the
orders of their superiors are unclear
this does not absolve them from
responsibility for helping to make the
enterprise succeed. The platoon com
mander will ask himself, if he is a
responsible officer, what would the
company commander have wanted
me to do if communications failed?
Judges should ask themselves the
same type of question when the
"orders" they receive from the fram
ers of statutes and constitutions are
unclear: what would the framers
have wanted me to do in this case of
failed communication? Obviously this
question is often difficult to answer,
but it seems to me to be the right
question to frame the interpretive

issue in cases where the enactment is
unclear.

Clear versus Unclear
Cases
I am naturally more interested in
the unclear cases of interpretation
than the clear ones. But it is impor
tant to insist that there are clear
cases, though they are under-repre
sented both in appellate opinions and
in academic debate .... A text is
clear only in virtue of a linguistic and
cultural competence ....
But the present point is that the
rejection of formalism as a method of
statutory interpretation doesn't con
demn us to universal skepticism
about the possibility of interpretation.
Interpretation is no less a valid
method of acquiring knowledge
because it necessarily ranges beyond
the text. As I have said, no text is
clear except in terms of a linguistic
and cultural environment, but it
doesn't follow that therefore no text
is clear. The relevant elements of the
environment, and their bearing on
the specific interpretive question,
may be clear.
Nevertheless it is true that many
statutory and constitutional texts,
including the most illustrious and
also many that seem clear "on their
face" (a pernicious usage), are
unclear in the sense of my hypotheti
cal company commander's order. The
lack of clarity does not, however,
entitle the court to say that it will not

Nancy Halliday Canary, herself a partner in the firm of Thompson, Mine & Flory, continues
support of the lecture series established by the bequest of her late husband, Sumner Canary, '28,
whose career included practice with the firm now known as Arter & Hadden, five years as U.S.
attorney for the Northern District of Ohio, and appointment to the Ohio Court of Appeals.
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apply the text until it is rewritten by
the authors. The court still has the
duty to interpret, and that requires,
as I have suggested, figuring out
what outcome will best advance the
program or enterprise set on foot by
the enactment. This conclusion is
entailed by my assumption that the
best way to look at the relationship
between legislatures (or the adopters
of the Constitution and its amend
ments) and courts is that of superior
and subordinate officers, with the
former being often unable to commu
nicate clearly with the latter.

A Fox Interprets
the Hedgehog
vf
by Peter Junger
Professor of Law

The appearance of a paper by
Posner, who is well on his way to
adjectival status—as in the phrase
"Posnerian analysis"—and who has
earned the right not to have his name
tarnished by honorifics like Judge
or—Lord help us!—Professor, is
always a significant occasion. To one,
like myself, who is not enamored of
Posnerian analysis, not enamored of
the economic analysis of law, there is
a certain paradoxical pleasure to be
had in recognizing the consistently
high value of his production, which
seems to belie the validity of the
economic doctrine that there are
diminishing returns to scale. I trust
that the judge will not take it badly if
I suggest that Posnerian analysis is
quite incapable of explaining the
phenomenon that is Posner.
When Peter Gerhart suggested that
I was qualified to write this com
ment, I understood that "qualified”
meant that I was the only one around
who would be foolhardy enough to
commit himself to get something
written and in the hands of the
printer in a mere eight days, a period
during which Posner would probably
turn out a dozen opinions and an
article or two. I also felt that I had a
certain disqualification for the task;
for I find economic analysis a most
partial (in more than one sense) tool.
It will not hurt if you keep that bias
in mind when you read these
remarks. There is, however, good
reason why I should not recuse
myself from commenting upon
"Legal Formalism, Legal Realism,
and the Interpretation of Statutes and
the Constitution" (hereafter
LFLRISC).
Sir Isaiah Berlin has, following
Archilochus and Erasmus, pointed
out one of the great intellectual
dichotomies: that between the fox
and the hedgehog. As Archilochus
put it, "The fox knows many things,
but the hedgehog knows one great
thing." In Sir Isaiah's words:
There exists a great chasm between
those, on one side, who relate every
thing to a single central vision, one
system less or more coherent or artic-

ulate, in terms of which they under
stand, think and feel—a single, uni
versal, organizing principle in terms
of which alone all that they are and
say has significance—and, on the
other side, those who pursue many
ends, often unrelated and even contra
dictory, connected, if at all, only in
some de facto way, for some psycho
logical or physiological cause, related
by no moral or aesthetic principle;
these last lead lives, perform acts, and
entertain ideas that are centrifugal
rather than centripetal, their thought
is scattered or diffused, moving on
many levels, seizing upon the essence
of a vast variety of experiences and
objects for what they are in them
selves, without, consciously or uncon
sciously, seeking to fit them into, or
exclude them from, any one unchang
ing, all-embracing, sometimes self
contradictory and incomplete, at times
fanatical, unitary inner vision. The
first kind of intellectual and artistic
personality belongs to the hedgehogs,
the second to the foxes; and without
insisting on a rigid classification, we
may, without too much fear of contra
diction, say that, in this sense, Dante
belongs to the first category, Shakes
peare to the second; Plato, Lucretius,
Pascal, Hegel, Dostoevsky, Nietzsche,
Ibsen, Proust are, in varying degrees,
hedgehogs; Herodotus, Aristotle,
Montaigne, Erasmus, Moliere,
Goethe, Pushkin, Balzac, Joyce are
foxes.

Now Posner is the Great Hedgehog,
and the Great Thing that he knows is
economic efficiency and the Coase
Theorem, while I am, at best, one of
"the little foxes, that . . . ." But I will
let you finish the quotation.
In normal circumstances a fox,
even a big fox, would be crazy—and
not like a fox—to take on a hedgehog.
But the appearance of LFLRISC is not
a normal circumstance; in that piece
the Great Hedgehog is, mirabile dictu,
making like a fox. Suddenly Posner is
not doing economic analysis—or
rather, he does it, but only in passing.
Suddenly Posner is into hermeneu
tics. Faute de mieux, I feel I should
'I. Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox (1953),
pp. 1-2.

take this opportunity to present the
foxes' defense against this incursion
into what, up to now, has been our
territory.
Now Posner does not use the word
'hermeneutics' in his article, but
LFLRISC itself is about the "art or
science of interpretation"—and that is
hermeneutics. If hermeneutics
comes, can deconstruction be far
behind? Does LFLRISC signify a
rapprochement between the Univer
sity of Chicago and the Frankfurt
school? The semiotic implications of
LFLRISC could be earthshaking:
when Twentieth Century Fox releases
The Son of the Name of the Rose, will
we discover that Jorge de Burgos
(who did not actually die at the Reichenbach Falls) has embraced the
faith of William of Baskerville?
I would not suggest that Posner has
revealed himself as a member of the
Critical Legal Studies movement: his
ideology clearly is not theirs. But
could he be doing to the Crits what
Marx did to Hegel?—standing their
arguments on their heads.
If that were the true interpretation
of LFLRISC, its appearance would be
a happy occasion for the foxes, and a
great honor to our cause. Being a fox,
or a hedgehog, is not a matter of
ideology: Roberto Unger, the theolo
gian of Critical Legal Studies, is prob
ably a hedgehog; Milton Friedman is
most likely a fox; Ronald Dworkin is,
beyond question, a hedgehog; Wil
liam Buckley is Volpone himself. The
chief difference is one of style: foxes
chatter, hedgehogs proclaim; foxes
interpret, hedgehogs have revela
tions. A fox can never win an argu
ment with a hedgehog. Hedgehogs do
not argue. Hedgehogs do not listen.
But if Posner were truly concerned
with interpretation, that foxy craft,
he would be compelled to listen to
our arguments in all their inconsis
tency. And listening, doubt. And
doubting, shed the prickly armor of
his austere faith. Tertullian was a
hedgehog.
Despite LFLRISC's concern with
interpretation, it gives no sign that
Posner has abandoned, or modified,
or questioned his Great Thing; quite
the contrary. Posner is too politic

ever to say explicitly that economic
analysis is a Theory Of Everything
(hereafter "TOE"), but it is impos
sible to interpret his writings—and
Posner concedes in LFLRISC (a most
magnanimous concession) the
unavoidable necessity of interpreting
written texts—without concluding that
for him economic analysis is indeed a
TOE.
It is a TOE, As the Chilean physiol
ogist (and hedgehog) Humberto
Maturana has discovered in his strug
gles to explain the workings of the
eye of a frog: "one can only say with
a given language what the language
permits."^ The language of Posnerian
analysis does not permit one to say
anything about many things of con
cern to foxes (and other hedgehogs):
it cannot explain the eye of a frog.^
But in this conceptual weakness lies
its strength; for economic analysis
can explain everything that can be
said in the language of economic
analysis. As for the rest, well, to that
which cannot be said, one must
remain deaf.

The Great Hedgehog has not
exchanged his utilitarian armor for a
fox coat; there has been no change in
his preference ordering. (Hedgehogs
have ordered preferences; foxes,
disorderly inclinations.) But this does
not mean that LFLRISC is an eco
nomic analysis: nor is it a set of
instructions as to how to do eco
nomic analysis. LFLRISC can best be
interpreted as a demonstration of
some of the metaprinciples which
underlie the Posnerian TOE, a revela
tion of the Great Hedgehog's ground
of being. As such it is a most impor
tant paper.
The key to interpreting Posner's
thought lies in LFLRISC's implicit
denial of the truism that to know
something is to know it in a context.
To know something in a context
entails the necessity of interpretation
(in the light of the context). But it is
the major claim of LFLRISC that
interpretation is needed by a judge
only in the case of written texts and
perhaps—the point is not addressed—
only in the case of statutes and con
stitutions. Thus LFLRISC denies the
necessity, ancj may ,well be intended
to deny the possibility, X)! interpreting
concepts, traditions, or ourselves.

^H. Maturana, Introduction, in H.
Maturana and F. Varela, Autopoiesis and
Cognition (1980), p. xiii.
“But cf. B. Heinrich, Bumblebee Economics
(1979).
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This denial places LFLRISC
squarely within our dominant intel
lectual tradition, the grand tradition
of the physical sciences and the engi
neering arts. The mode of thought
handed down through this tradition is
objective (as opposed to subjective),
reductive, analytic (as opposed to
synthetic), quantitative, mechanistic,
logicist, radically this-worldly, and,
for the most part, empiric. It denies
the god in the machine; when it
deigns to look at man, it sees only
mechanism.
So long as it confines its attention
to Newtonian mechanisms—and it
cannot conceive of anything else—it
works. Glockenspiels, steam engines,
automobiles, rockets, fast-food joints,
television sets, chicken factories, and
computers: our lives are lived among
its triumphal monuments. On the
other hand, it does not work very
well if one's purpose is to explain
God's way to man, or vice versa. It
does not work very well if one's
purpose is to explain oneself—or to
explain one's purpose. The mechanis
tic tradition has no room for teleolog
ical concepts, human (or even brute)
feelings, or—if Maturana is right—the
insight of a frog.
This being so, one would not
expect the dominant tradition, the
tradition of Posner's TOE, to be capa
ble of dealing with the moral sci
ences; for the subject of such sci
ences is man, and man is a subjective
being, with aspirations, feelings, and
purposes. Man is a self-interpreting
animal in the hermeneutic sense.
This hermeneutic concept of interpre
tation—the craft of discovering the
significance to ourselves of the phe
nomena (including ourselves) that
form our world—is totally alien to the
mode of thought that is the context of
LFLRISC.
In the words of Charles Taylor:
The thesis that man is a self
interpreting being . . . runs against
one of the fundamental prejudices, or,
to sound less negative, leading ideas
of modern thought and culture. It
violates a paradigm of clarity and
objectivity.
According to this, thinking cleaply
about something, with a view to arriv
ing at the truth about it, requires that
we think of it objectively, that is, as
an object among other 'objects. This
means that we avoid attributing to it
properties, or describing it in terms of
properties, which are 'subjective' in
the sense that they are only properties
of the object in our experience of it.
This was one of the basic compo
nents of the seventeenth-century revo
lution in scientific thought, which we
still see rightly as the foundation of

modern science, and indeed of mod
ern thought in general.''

The dominant tradition is so perva
sive, however, that its prejudices
have been adopted by the social
sciences, albeit at great cost to their
explanatory power. The way—the
only way—for a human being to
study human beings from a nonsubjective viewpoint is to study
something else, some surrogate that
lacks the attributes of humanity.
One way in which this objectifica
tion of man can be accomplished is
to adopt a radically empiricist
approach: in psychology, behaviorists
observe behavior and nothing more;
in economics, econometricians
observe the ebb and flow of aggre
gates of goods and factors, and noth
ing more human than 'propensities'
to consume or save. Such studies
may have predictive value, but they
are totally without explanatory
power: they are uninterpreted.
This empiric way is, however, not
the way of LFLRISC or of the eco
nomic analysis of law. The objects
which economic analysis studies,
which are the Everything within the
Posnerian TOE, are not observable,
are not empirical. They are mathe
matical models whose symbols are
not interpreted within the theory.
Whatever meaning they have must
be given in some metatheory for
meaning cannot reside within an
uninterpreted model. In particular,
the profit-maximizing creatures of
economic analysis are not self
interpreting.
LFLRISC does not set out the well
known characteristics of the crea
tures which inhabit the economic
model. (Those creatures are simply
mathematical functions with real
values—usually measured in 'dol
lars'—, which take something—
'goods' and 'factors'—as their argu
ments, have the property of
transitivity, and are subject to certain
mathematical constraints, and which
maximize their value subject to those
constraints.) LFLRISC is not about
economic analysis. But just because it
deals with matters outside the normal
scope of economic models, LFLRISC
contains the clearest statement that
has yet appeared of the conceptual
constraints which make that type of
objective analysis possible.
As should by now be clear, an
essential feature of Posnerian analysis
is that its objects are concepts, not
empirical data, and that these objects
are what they are defined to be. In
this sense Posner can be taken to be
an extreme nominalist; his words

‘C. Taylor, Human Agency and Language
(1985), pp. 45-6.

mean whatever he means them to
mean.^ (Humpty Dumpty was a
hedgehog.I A corollary is that words
in LFLRISC often do not have their
ordinary meanings.
This latter point is made explicitly
when Posner redefines 'legal formal
ism' and ‘legal realism' to establish
his mode of analysis as the rightful
heir to both traditions. It is exposed
more strikingly, however, by the
claim that the formalists, with their
preference for treating their premises
as self-evident, were indulging in "a
kind of nominalism, or conceptual
ism, or Platonism; the idea that con
cepts exist 'out there,' like trees or
rocks, rather than are created." The
terms 'Platonism' and 'nominalism'
are normally treated as opposites, but
in LFLRISC they appear to have
identical meanings—because the
Posnerian TOE cannot admit that
there is any "out there" there, for
Posner is a conceptualist by his own
definition: all there is are concepts,
and it makes no matter whether a
concept is a nominal tree or a Pla
tonic idea.
In LFLRISC we are told that the
common law "is a collection of con
cepts, such as negligence, consider
ation, possession, good faith, conspir
acy, impossibility, and laches, which
furnish major premises for the deci
sion of cases; the minor premises are
the facts of the case." The major
premises are reached on 'policy'
grounds; the minor premises are
statements of facts. It appears that
both types of concepts, major and
minor, are simply given to us; there
is no need nor room for interpreta
tion. 'Legal realism' is defined as the
"critical" task of determining the
principles which supply the major
premises; 'legal formalism' is nothing
more—or less—than the logical
deduction of the conclusions which
follow with mathematical inevitabil
ity from the premises. By these defi
nitions, realism and formalism are
not opposed; they are complemen
tary. Together they are necessary and
sufficient to decide any common law
issue, though Posner insists that they
are not capable of dealing with stat
ute and constitutional law, a point to
which I shall return in a moment.
LFLRISC has nothing to say about
fact finding, except for the casual
remark that though case arguments
are in theory determined by the
"deductive method," "the actuality is
far, far messier, in part because a
^Cf. Leff, "Economics Analysis of Law;
Some Realism About Nominalism," 60
Virginia Law Review (1974). In this article,
Leff, the greatest legal fox of the centurymay his legacy endure!—makes a compari
son of legal formalism and legal realism
that is, at once, quite similar to LFLRISC
in formulation and very different from it
in spirit (pp. 453-56).

Peter Junger took both B.A. and LL.B.
degrees at Harvard University and practiced
through the 1960s with Patterson, Belknap &
Webb in New York before then-Dean Louis
A. Toepfer recruited him for the Case
Western Reserve law faculty. He has been
here since 1970 except for visiting years at
Ohio State University (1974-75j and the
University of Miami (1985-86).

number of minor premises [i.e., facts]
involving motivation, information,
etc., are contested." That concepts
like 'motivation' are subjective and
discoverable only by some type of
interpretation is not recognized
within LFLRISC.
Nor does it have much to say about
the choice of the major premises, the
resolution of the "critical" issues of
public policy. LFLRISC contends that
the premises of the law must be
chosen so that the outcome of a case
"best promotes public welfare in
nonlegalistic terms," "rather than just
be the result of arbitrary personal
preferences or antipathies, or class
bias, or some other thoroughly dis
credited ground of judicial action,"
but it makes no affirmative sugges
tion as to how a judge or anyone else
is to determine what best promotes
the public welfare. It cannot logically
make such suggestions, for—what
ever Posner may have claimed else
where—a basic tenet of the dominant
tradition is the Humean doctrine that
one cannot get from an 'is' to an
'ought'; within LFLRISC 'public wel
fare' can only be an 'objective' con
cept without normative content. It
appears that there is nothing within
Posner's Great Thing that speaks to
such issues. Nor need there be, for
Posner simply posits the premise that
"the common law seeks to promote
efficiency in the sense of wealth
maximization." No attempt is made
in LFLRISC to justify this premise.
Ultimately it just assumes "that the
concepts which provide the major
premises for common law reasoning

(whether an overarching premise
such as wealth maximization, or
particular legal concepts such as
negligence that can be deduced from
it) can be and are altered by judges in
accordance with changing percep
tions of public policy." Ultimately, in
the case of common law decisions,
the judges are "the legislators." And
that is all there is to say about it.
What is starkly missing is any
sense that common law judges are
constrained by "precedent, custom,
tradition, expected ways of doing
things, predicted patterns of behav
ior,"® the traditional sources of the
oracles of the law. The only refer
ence to the problem of following
precedents (which might, of course
involve interpretation) is the casual
aside: "Of course the pace of change
is affected by the need to preserve a
reasonable degree of stability in law,
but this is just another policy consid
eration." It is obvious on this view
that the premises of the law cannot
be arrived at by any process of inter
pretation. There is nothing to inter
pret.
Far more important to an interpre
tation of Posner's thought is the 'for
malist' component, for in LFLRISC
Posner pins the label 'formalist' on
himself with a gusto that could
scarcely be matched by his boldest
critic: "The modern exemplar of
formalism in common law is the
positive economic analysis of the
common law that Professor Landes
and I and others have expounded."
And how formal is this formalism?
As formal as mathematics: "Eco
nomic theory is a logical system like
calculus or geometry . . . , or more
precisely a family of such theories."
And how formal is the common law?
As formal as economic theory: "If the
positive economic theory of the com
mon law is right"—and it is clear that
the Great Hedgehog is positive that it
is right—then "the common law is a
logical system; and deductive logicformal reasoning—can be used to
reach demonstrably correct results in
particular cases, or to demonstrate
the correctness of results in particu
lar cases."
And thus does the Great Hedge\
hog's Theory Of Everything explain—
or explain away—the common law.
There are only premises chosen to
enhance the public welfare—which,
of course, in LFLRISC means chosen
to maximize wealth—and conclusions
(holdings) logically deduced from
such premises. Everything is
accounted for and there is nothing to
interpret.
But this leaves us with a consider
able puzzle. Why is the major portion
“Buchanan, "Good Economics—Bad Law,"
60 Virginia Law Review (1974), pp. 483,
489.
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of LFLRISC devoted to interpreta
tion?
To answer that question requires us
to distinguish between Professor
Posner and Judge Posner. To the
professor economic analysis is a the
ory of everything, including the com
mon law. To the judge it is a theory
of almost everything, including the
common law. What it cannot explain
to the judge is the deference that he
owes as a judge to statutes and to the
Constitution. In LFLRISC the judge is
a legislator who creates and modifies
"the doctrines of the common law."
But to Posner "statutory and constitu
tional law differs fundamentally from
common law in that every statute
and constitutional provision ... is in
some important sense not to be
revised by the judges."
But why is that difference funda
mental? The fact that someone other
than the judge supplies the premises
does not seem to prevent the judge
from deducing their logical conse
quences as required by Posnerian
formalism.
As it turns out, that is not the prob
lem. The difficulty lies in the fact
that the judge—that good soldier—
receives his orders in the form of
words, and words—language, a textare something with which our domi
nant tradition—Posner's TOE—is not
prepared to deal. On the other hand,
"the common law, like the system of
real numbers, is a conceptual sys
tem—not a textual system .... Com
mon law thus is unwritten law in a
profound sense. There are more or
less influential statements of every
doctrine but none is authoritative in

the sense that the decision of a new
case must be tied to the statement,
rather than to the concept of which
the statement is one of an indefinite
number of possible formulations."
But statutes and constitutions are text
and "meaning cannot be extracted
from a text merely by taking the
language of the text and applying the
rules of logic to it." Texts have to be
"interpreted (or decoded)."
To contend that common law con
cepts are so clear that they—like real
numbers—do not have to be inter
preted can only be described as
heroic. I am sure that Posner is clear
on what a real number is; as for me,
I have trouble understanding inte
gers. But this doctrine of the inherent
clarity of concepts—simply by virtue
of their not being said—seems to be
an essential component of the theory
of almost everything that is LFLRISC.
After that contention, to further
contend that "all sorts of linguistic
and cultural tools must be brought to
bear on even the simplest-seeming
text to get meaning out of it" can
only be described as straining at a
gnat after swallowing a camel.
As a fox, I cannot help but believe
that all sorts of linguistic and cultural
tools must be brought to bear to get
meaning out of the sources of the
common law and that even more
tools are needed to get meaning out
of a fact.
I think, however, that I know why
Posner finds a text so difficult. As I
said earlier, Posnerian analysis cannot
explain the phenomenon that is
Posner. At least in part this is so
because Posner is a linguistic being, a

discursive being, an "animal possess
ing logos," as Aristotle puts it. The
language, like the ontology, of
LFLRISC is too powerfully limited to
be able to deal with language itself,
for when we speak the subjective
element inevitably sneaks in.
As a fox I would suggest that
Posner's Great Thing is too simple to
deal with common law concepts, just
as it is too simple to deal with the
much easier—I submit—task of apply
ing statutory provisions. The fact that
the common law is not to be found in
a single authoritative text does not
mean that it is does not have to be
interpreted.
As a lawyer I am a bit concerned at
the idea that a judge is a legislator
rather than an interpreter of our legal
tradition. I am more concerned, how
ever, at the idea that a judge is a
good soldier who simply obeys orders
from the legislature, even though he
has on occasion difficulty in decoding
them.
On balance, though, I am delighted
that the greatest of our hedgehogs
does see that interpretation can be a
problem—and a necessity—for a
judge, that the life of the law is more
than mathematics. Texts require
interpretation because they are
embedded in language, that most
subjective and human of contexts.
Is it not possible that the law itself
is much like language, equally sub
jective and human? And that, in
consequence, all law, not just stat
utes, needs interpretation?

The Portab] e John Tiley
by Erik M. Jensen
Associate Professor of Law

For the second time in a year, read
ers of In Brief are blessed with a
contribution from John Tiley. (See
"U.S. Tax Reform: An Alien Being's
View," May 1986.) In these pages
you are receiving an introduction, all
too brief, to the wisdom, knowledge,
and wit of this extraordinary man. If
you are challenged and intrigued by
these writings—and'hpi^ could you
not be?—think how lucky those of us
in residence at the Law School have
been: Professor Tiley, currently uni
versity lecturer, Faculty of Law, Uni
versity of Cambridge, and fellow of
Queens' College, Cambridge, visited
with us from August 1985 until Octo
ber 1986. And we are further
blessed:' Tiley has agreed to return to
CWRU for several weeks each fall.
It would be difficult to overstate
8

what Professor Tiley's visit has meant
to this law school. Tiley is an interna
tionally known tax scholar (hence the
wisdom, knowledge, and wit); his*
mere presence brought honor to us.
But John Tiley was not at CWRU to
relax and accept accolad^es. He is a
scholarly dynamo, and he was a
vigorous participant in the intellec
tual life of this institution. During the
year, he published and lectured
widely, carrying the CWRU banner
with him. He left his intellectual
mark in other, less easily quantifi
able, ways as well. He prodded his
colleagues and students, when prod
ding was appropriate, and our work
was the better for it. He provided
flattery, when the egos of some junior
faculty members needed boosting.
And the Law School administration

did not escape the Tiley influence: to
the lasting benefit of the school, he
politely (he is English, after all), but
pointedly, noted serious gaps in the
library's collections.
Those who would like further
exposure to Tiley's tax writings—and
that should include many of you—
might examine his most recent
article, "More on Receivability and
Receipt," 1986 British Tax Review 152.
Although directed to a British audi
ence, the article discusses an issue
that is also at the cutting edge of
United States tax law, the timing of
income inclusion. As usual, Tiley
demonstrates that grace and scholarly
writing about taxation are not mutu
ally exclusive. More pleasures await
us. We can look forward to the publi
cation of at least two articles that will

be directly traceable to Tiley's time
in Cleveland. Tiley is reexamining
the United States tax doctrine of
"substance over form" (and its identi
cal twin, the "step transaction" doc
trine), under which the form of a
carefully crafted transaction may be
disregarded and the "substance"
given tax effect. From his American
research Tiley will educate British tax
lawyers about this curious doctrine
that is creeping, perhaps galloping,
into British law. And he will educate
us Americans as well, providing a
much needed fresh look, a compara
tive look, at a principle that American
tax lawyers have come to take for
granted.
Lest I scare readers from "Two
Nations Divided by a Common Law,"
let me assure you that it has little to
do with taxation (except insofar as
everything has a great deal to do
with taxation). Tiley is a student of
jurisprudence, of comparative law, of
history. The breadth and depth of his
learning, from which all of us at
CWRU benefited this year, are amply
reflected in that essay.
As a teacher. Professor Tiley
brought to the classroom a perspec
tive that American students must
have found invaluable. As Professor
Karen Nelson Moore, with whom
Tiley has taught a pair of courses,
comments, "John Tiley afforded the
Law School a unique opportunity to
explore comparative tax questions.
He brought to our international and
foreign tax class helpful insights into
another tax system's choices with

respect to the taxation of domestic
and foreign income." Tiley also
brightened Professor Leon Gabinet's
already glowing courses in corporate
income taxation, integrating into the
course of instruction the fruits of
Tiley's research on form and sub
stance.
Scholar, teacher, and, of course,
friend, John Tiley was a personal
delight throughout his time here.
And, although 1 cannot speak for
Tiley, I believe that he enjoyed his
stay in Cleveland (as much as one
can when separated from family). His
support for the city's cultural activi
ties shamed the rest of us. There was
no more regular visitor to Severance
Hall. He joined and regularly visited
the museums of art and natural his
tory. He partook of Cleveland's ath
letic offerings, albeit not always with
the best results. (Students of intellec
tual history interested in the origins
of his article's reference to the Indi
ans' search in far-off lands for pitch
ing—a humorous treatment of a fun
damentally serious subject—need
look no farther than Cleveland Sta
dium. Tiley visited that venerable
ball yard on two nights last summer
when the Indians lost by scores of
19-2 and 24-5, the low points of an
otherwise vibrant 1986 campaign.)^
Were this a eulogy, I would end by
stating that we shall not see John
Tiley's likes again. Happily, it is not,
and we shall—next August. Perhaps
another In Brief offering will then be
available. To tide you over until that
time, however, I commend to you

Two Nations Divided by a Common

an essay bristling with insights,
with questions to ponder,'* and with
humor.
Law,

NOTES
'Whether blessings can be counted (the socalled "pennies from heaven" theory of
the Chicago School) or whether they must
be otherwise evaluated is an issue that
sharply divides scholars. On that question,
see the article by Professor Peter Junger,
"A Fox Interprets the Hedgehog," in this
journal,
"Tiley did, however, witness a Cleveland
victory on Independence Day, a fact that I
should somehow be able to analyze in
terms of U.S.-U.K. relations. And I should
note that Professor Cabinet also attended
the 24-5 rout, his first baseball game since
the time of Abner Doubleday, and he
must share the blame for that miserable
evening.
"For example, was Professor John Austin
really different from the Professor Austin
we have here? Or, if he was different, can
that difference be attributed to the fact
that John Austin "taught and wrote in the
nineteenth century"?

About the author: Erik M. Jensen joined the
faculty in 1983, quickly established himself
as teacher and scholar, and was recently
promoted to the rank of associate professor.
He teaches tax courses and Business
Planning. Jensen’s law degree is from Cornell
University: before coming here, he clerked
for Judge Monroe G. McKay of the Tenth
Circuit and practiced in New York with
Sullivan & Cromwell.

TWo Nations
Divided by a Common Law
by John Tiley
Visiting Professor of Law
On September 30, just before he completed
his teaching assignment and returned to his
home base in England, Professor Tiley lec
tured to the Law School Academy. This is a
transcription, minimally edited.—K.E.T.

I suspect that the best thing about
this particular talk is the title: "TWo
Nations Divided by a Common Law."
It does beg a lot of questions about
what we understand by "common
law," and what I'm going to be doing
is to try and highlight some of the
differences between law here and
law as we have it in England.

A Common Law
When you came to this law school,
I suppose one of the first things you
did was to seek a definition of "the
common law." You knew that you
were going to study a common law
system, and so you started along the
lines that common law was the body
of rules administered by common

law courts. And then, being good
historians, you would go to the books
and you would find that the common
law courts were judicial bodies that
emerged in England in the course of
the thirteenth century. And that set
you up for three years in the law
school of intense historical study.
A moment ago I described the
common law as a body of rules, a
very positivist notion. There is
another way of looking at "the com
mon law," and that is to say it is the
customary law, which is accepted by
a particular group of people, a partic
ular elite (a notion explored by Pro
fessor Simpson in his contribution to
Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, 2d
series). The particular elite we have
in mind, of course, would be the

legal profession in England at the end
of the thirteenth century and in the
fourteenth century, because one of
the most significant changes that
came about was at the very end of
the thirteenth century, when it was
decided that judges should be
selected from the ranks of lawyers.
That meant selected from the ranks
of senior lawyers, so that you had a
career leading to a judicial appoint
ment that presupposed practice at the
bar first of all. This is totally differ
ent from the civil law countries,
where they have a separate profes
sion of judge.
From that thirteenth-century begin
ning we seem to have come a long
way. You seem to have traveled this
road with a little more exuberance
than we have, and you have done all
sorts of things which strike the for
eign lawyer as—according to last
week's National Law Journal—bizarre.
I want to focus on one or two of
these rather curious features just for
a minute.

The U.S. System—A
Caricature
In the interests of caricature—now
in all caricature there is an underly
ing substance of truth!—foreign law
yers, even lawyers coming from
England, do find the U.S. system
bizarre. Our vision of U.S. attorneys
is colored by lawyers flying into
India immediately after the Bhopal
disaster seeking to sign up clients,
much the same way that the general
manager of the Cleveland Indians
might go into the jungles of South
America to find a tribe that does
nothing but pitch.
Then we read about people who
wait ten years on death row, waiting
to be executed. At the same time as
the National Law Journal was carrying
that suggestion that the U.S. law
system seemed bizarre to outsiders,
tire New York Times was reporting
that attorneys seemed reluctant to
take appeals against death sentences
now because of the emotional drain,
the lack of financial reward, and the
small chance of success. Spelt out in
that way, you seem to be offering law
as a substance in the marketplace,
much as the same as other sub
stances.
Then we find juries giving $12
billion damages. Juries! Why $12
billion is bad enoughj But to have
these things decided by juries strikes
us—even from England—as strange.
Then we read about the jury awards
in personal injury cases, and we
wonder why the judges aren't con
trolling your juries better. And then I
get told, "Well you don't understand
the American institution of the jury.
It is an invaluable bulwark of free
dom of the individual." I read with
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interest about your proposals to limit
damages in various cases of personal
injuries. What strikes me as a cynical
observer is that it's not much use
setting a maximum because what
begins as a maximum very soon
becomes the norm.
Then you have combined civil and
criminal jurisdiction in the state
courts. And you have elected judges!
Now all this strikes me, coming from
where I come from, as strange. But
we can go further.

The Role of Law
You have a view of the role of law
in society. The range of issues that
are susceptible to the legal process is
unlimited. It is beyond the imagina
tion of an ordinary Englishman to
imagine any limit to the questions
that you will litigate somewhere,
sometime, and preferably at someone
else's expense.
But then you also attack your legal
questions in a different way. You are
always looking for policy. You are
always looking for the reasons
behind rules, and as a result you
believe—and at this stage I think
exaggeratedly—that there are no such
things as fixed rules. You will find
when you get into practice that there
are a lot of rules that are very fixed,
and no amount of pleading of policy
will enable you to convince a court
that this will should be probated or
that particular trust upheld. But you
will no doubt condemn this as a very
parochial wills-and-trusts outlook.
So you litigate all the time, any
where, and in the most bizarre way.
At least it must seem so to a for
eigner, because we are all wedded to
the system we know. The law course
we ourselves took was always the
best law course. And so it was.

The Divided Profession
I now want to come to some insti
tutional differences between the U.S.
and the U.K., and I suppose the first
one I have to address is the phenom
enon of the divided profession. But
by way of preface let me stress that I
am dealing with England. The Uruted
Kingdom is a different entity. The
United Kingdom consists of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland. There
is some little difficulty ^bout North
ern Ireland at the moment, but we
will gloss over that. In Great Britain
we also have Scotland, which is a
separate legal jurisdiction that has its
origins in the civil law and not in the
common law, and there are some
fascinating differences between the
two. I'm going to concentrate on
England, which for this purpose
includes Wales, because Wales was
conquered before Scotland was con
quered and they were given English
law as a bonus.
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Wigs and Things
So in England we find a divided
profession, divided between barris
ters and solicitors. When you go into
court you know the difference
because the barristers wear wigs and
the solicitors do not. As you go
around the London courts, you will
see people clutching papers which
are tied in a nice pink ribbon; those
bundles are called briefs. The distinc
tion between a lady barrister and a
solicitor, according to one particular
high court judge, is that lady barris
ters are the ones with briefs and solic
itors are those without. Which tells
you what judicial humor is like in
England. (Much the same as here. We
have found a similarity. What a pity.)
Two (inaccurate) differences are
often put forward. These are that
barristers do court work whereas
solicitors don't, and that barristers
have expertise whereas solicitors do
not.
As to court work,' quite a lot of
barristers don't go to court at all.
They are, particularly in the tax and
trusts area, people who advise, peo
ple who draw up settlements and
who wouldn't dream of going into
court. Moreover, many solicitors do a
lot of court work and do it extremely
well.
With regard to expertise, it is true
to say that some barristers have great
expertise, but in many areas solicitors

have equal if not greater expertise. In
my own area, that of tax, solicitors
have become more and more expert.
They go to tax counsel only if there is
a very, very abstruse issue and they
want to shift the risk of liability from
their own insurance policy onto the
barrister's insurance policy—or if
there is a risk of litigation.
Audience and Partnerships
But the more crucial and the more
precise differences are that barristers
have the sole right of audience in the
higher courts in England and that
barristers cannot be instructed by a
lay client: all work has to come to
barristers through a solicitor,
although you, as U.S. attorneys, can
instruct a barrister direct. There are
differences in structure in that the
barristers are a much smaller profes
sion grouped around the four inns of
court (everyone has to be a member
of an inn of court), whereas there are
many more solicitors and they are
organized by the Law Society. Histori
cally barristers are not officers of the
court; solicitors are. And—a differ
ence which is of great importance in
practice, at least to people in your
particular position—members of the
bar are not allowed to practice in
partnership.
This last point is of great impor
tance as it means that it is very hard
to start at the bar, as fans of Rumpole
will have seen. By contrast, solicitors
join law firms Just as you do, and
they find it easy to start with, and
they draw huge salaries of perhaps
seven thousand pounds a year. That's
about ten thousand dollars, and
they're worth every penny.
Reasons for the Division
Now this division, which always
seems to interest American lawyers,
naturally invites some degree of justi
fication. Of course that is a very unEnglish thing to do. In England you
don't ask "why,” you ask "since
when," and we could spend a lot of
time on "since when." But there are
some practical reasons which do
justify the present set-up.
Under the present structure barris
ters' services are available to all, so a
high-powered barrister can be
instructed one day by a leading city
firm and the next day by some very
small firm out in the country. This
enables small local practices to
remain in a fairly flourishing condi
tion and also gives the talent of the
bar to every client who can afford it.
The second justification is that the
barrister, because everything is fil
tered before it reaches him, is
removed from the everyday organiza
tion of the case and therefore brings
a fresh mind to it. The danger of a
fresh mind is that it can be an unin

formed mind. But the theoretical
justification I think is sound.
There is also a surprising justifica
tion, which is that it is often cheaper
to use a barrister than it is to use a
solicitor. A busy solicitor does not
want to go down to a court and
spend all day waiting for a case to
come on. He would much rather pay
a barrister a set fee to go and sit and
wait, and send some junior clerk to
sit with him during the day.
The arguments against it of course
are that you necessarily have a dupli
cation of personnel, particularly in
high court cases, and in major cases
it can lead to very serious excess
costs. But whether you think it's
justified or not, it is there, and as the
rules of professions are always writ
ten by people who have succeeded in
them, it is difficult to change.
Possible Changes
So, I would have said, perhaps
even at the start of this year (1986),
but there is some evidence that we
are going to get a change. There is
some evidence that solicitors are
going to be given the right of audi
ence in all cases, and it will be very
interesting to see whether that hap
pens. The judges think that it is
within their jurisdiction to decide
who will appear before them and
they don't need a statute to change
that. Judges will suddenly one day
decide that solicitors have that right,
and then the barristers with equal
grace and speed will retaliate by
taking cases direct from the public.
And what will we then have? We will
have de facto fusion of the profes
sion. But not de jure—heaven forfend! It would be most un-English to
have a de jure fusion.

Judges
Our judges are different from
yours. Like you we have various tiers
of judges, and I will just talk about
some of them. In the high court itself
we have a lot of judges. They are full
time, they are usually extremely
good, and they have all spent a con
siderable amount of time in the very
senior ranks of the profession. They
tend to get appointed around about
the age of fifty, and they serve for at
least fifteen years. There is now a
retiring age of seventy-five. There are
many of these judges now, well over
a hundred.
At the other end of the judicial
system we have magistrates. These
are lay people who have a profes
sional clerk to advise them on the
law. They deal with a lot of petty
crime and a lot of family work.
In between we have judges called
circuit judges who operate in the
crown courts and in the county
courts. The crown courts are criminal
courts, and the county courts are

civil courts. The circuit judges who
are appointed to these are full time,
but they are assisted by an extensive
network of recorders and assistant
recorders who are part-time people.
If you are a barrister of a certain age,
you usually do three years as an
assistant recorder and then three
years as a recorder, and then when
the system has had a good chance to
see whether you are any good as a
judge, you may be invited to become
a circuit judge, or sometimes directly
a judge of the high court.
The judicial system in England
could not operate at the moment
without the help of these deputy
judges. It may well now be the case
that more judge-days are provided by
these part-time judges than by the
full-time judges.
From this structure a number of
differences flow. English judges go
through a process of judicial training,
which yours do not. They are not
elected; they are emphatically
appointed. They are appointed only
after sitting for a certain amount of
time and having their abilities
checked. The caseload that they have
to cope with is nothing like so great
as the load that your judges are asked
to deal with. They have no clerks in
your sense.
Moreover we don't have a system
whereby the judge has control of the
litigation all the way through, from
start to finish. We have a whole
range of court officials whose job it is
to make sure the case is prepared for
trial, make sure all the applications
for discovery are dealt with, and so
on. All the procedural matters are
dealt with by various court officials
and registrars, and then the matter is
brought to trial before the judge. And
it may well be that if you've had an
application for an injunction earlier
on, some quite different judge has
dealt with that application from the
one who deals with the matter when
it comes to final resolution. And we
have civil and criminal cases in quite
separate structures. And we have no
juries in civil cases, with the excep
tion of defamation and malicious
prosecution and one or two others
like that. The result of all this is a
great deal of judicial control and a
great burden on the judge in a civil
case as he has to decide all the issues
of fact, all the questions of law, and
then give damages.

Law Students
Now how do these people get
there? What about your equivalents
over there? Students, people who are
keen, well informed, and always
prepared; that is intended as a
description of you. What are your
counterparts over there like?
They are younger. Law in England
is an undergraduate subject. It is

studied therefore by people between
the ages of eighteen and twenty-one.
This is a product of our English edu
cational system, which is much more
specialized than yours is at an earlier
age. From ages sixteen to eighteen
most people in English schools who
are going on to university study just
three subjects, maybe four if they're
scientists and they're doing maths,
physics, chemistry. If they're on the
arts side, they tend to do English,
history, and French, or some other
grouping of three subjects, and that is
it. But they are being molded for indepth study on a fairly narrow range.
'This process is continued when
they get to university. They do a
three-year course consisting of lec
tures—and some of you will have
gathered that I am used to lecturing
in England—and the lecturing con
sists of a talking book. There are no
questions. The definition of a lecture
is "information being conveyed from
the lecturer's notebook to the stu
dent's notebook without passing
through the mind of either." There is
a case for observing that there is such
a thing as a printed book now, and
that it may follow that the talking
book is not necessary, but that is
another matter.
The lectures are backed up by a
series of tutorials or "supervisions,”
depending on which university you
come from. These are meetings in
groups of three or four. Each of the
three or four people writes an essay
each week for the tutorial, and there
are about two a week. For each of
those essays the student will be
expected to read perhaps fifty pages
of a textbook—yes, there are text
books in England, and we expect
students to read them! They would
also read five or more articles,
twenty-plus cases, perhaps ten com
mentaries on cases, and when they
have gathered in the thoughts of
others and assimilated them, they
direct their minds to answering ques
tions. There may be an essay on a
particular topic, or there may be a
series of problems which they are
required to answer. They bring those
with them to the session, or prefera
bly hand them in in advance for
marking, and matters are discussed.
You will appreciate that in a group of
three or four there is less place to
hide if you are unprepared, which
has happened, I believe, once or
twice here in>the history of this law
school.
While these people are studying
law, they do very few subjects com
pared with you; they do five subjects
a year at most. The year is split up
into three terms with no semester
system, so in their three years they
do perhaps fourteen subjects. The
advantages, we think, are that it
gives the student time to let the ideas
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sink in; we develop very specific
skills; we get to know the students
very well (inevitably); and we think
we are providing an education rather
than a professional training.

Professional Training
Now that is important, because a
graduate of a law school in the
United Kingdom is not qualified to
practice. How you become qualified
to practice depends on whether
you're going to be a barrister or a
solicitor. If you're going to be a bar
rister, you go into a one-year course
at something called the Council of
Legal Education, which is organized
by the bar. After that you do twelve
months' serving in chambers as a
pupil, and after that you are allowed
to practice. If you want to be a solici
tor, you do a different twelve
months' course which is very inten
sive and very practical. You fill in
lots of forms and learn how to do
that, which is invaluable, and then
you serve two years in articles in a
firm. Only after that are you quali
fied to practice on your own.
There are advantages and disadvan
tages in these things. English law
students are young. They are very
young. They are very bright. And
despite their youth they can cope
with English rules of law, English
notions of what law is about. The
price paid is that they do far too few
subjects. Fourteen in three years
compared with the number you do
means that in most universities there
is only one tax course, and in Oxford
and Cambridge there are no tax
courses in the undergraduate curricu
lum.

The Nature of Law
These things are all related to the
nature of the law itself. If I begin by
saying English judges are respected, I
might be thought to be making a
contrast. English judges are
respected. We are a much more def
erential society than yours. English
law tends to respect precedent far
more than you do. It may well be
that we have respected precedent too
much. In the 1950s, when I began
my legal studies, we had the great
Lord Simmonds sitting ^t the top of
the English legal system, and he was
a conservative of the darkest hue. He
produced the memorable line, "Het
erodoxy is not made the more attrac
tive to me by being blessed with the
name of reform." He did not think it
was his function as a judge to change
the law. Changing the law was a
matter for Parliament. And of course
we had a relatively active Parliament.
We believe in the sovereignty of
Parliament. Parliament can do any
thing it likes.

Now there are reasons for our
difference from you in this respect.
We are a single jurisdiction; you are
emphatically not. English cases have
a common law. We generally think
that there is a right answer to most
issues that come before the court.
Yes, a right answer. Not politically
right, not justifiably right, but a tech
nically correct decision. And that is
something that causes some of you
amusement, I see, but if you read the
writings of Ronald Dworkin you will
find there is a strong jurisprudential
cases for saying that there is a right
answer in most cases. You of course
have fifty jurisdictions to contend
with—judges who have an immense
caseload, whose opportunity for error
(or divergence of opinion, according
to taste), is necessarily much greater
than ours.
But at the same time as we have
this respect for case law, we have
done a lot to destroy case law by
going in for legislation. We have a
body called the Law Commission,
which is entrusted with the process
of law reform, and they are expected
to act through the legislature. This
reduces the role of judges in reform
ing the law and increases the pattern
of legislation in the very areas where
judges probably ought to be active.
It's not quite as bad as that. There
is a contrast, but it is not pure carica
ture. Our judges have become much
more active, partly because we
believe that education is important
and many of the judges now on the
bench have studied the American
realists' movements when they were
undergraduates, and many of them
have studied law in the United States
anyway. We have a great deal of
development going on, particularly in
the area of public law.

So what does it all add up to?
We are different. We are very dif
ferent. I envy you much of the things
you do. I envy you your vigor, your
vitality, your willingness to go for a
reason behind a rule and then formu
late the rule in terms of that reason. I
envy you your willingness to treat
questions broadly, your energy in
treating legislation as embodying
principle.
Your law is much more difficult as
a result of this than ’English law is. It
is more subtle, it is more elusive, it is
more complex—and therefore per
haps more suited for study by older
people.
It's also, as I read the cases, very
irritating, because many of your
judges rarely give what strike me as
adequate reasons for the decisions
they reach—reasons in terms of the
technical arguments that have been
placed before them. The judge will

simply say, "I decide this, I decide
that." You think our cases are far too
long, that our judges are prolix, and
maybe you are right. I think your
cases are far too short. It's almost as
though every case was designed to be
put into a casebook for study in law
school, trying to work out whatever
it is that the judge might actually
have meant.
And yet, what you are looking at is
a difference of philosophy. We go
back to the beginning—common law
as a body of rules. In England we are

still very much under the influence
of Professor Austin—Professor John
Austin, who taught and wrote in the
nineteenth century and was therefore
different from the Professor Austin
you have here.
Austin, Bentham, and the jurisprudes of that particular school
taught us that there was a right
answer, that law could be reasonably
certain, and that legislation could
make things more certain still. And
so we have been led to believe. We
believe that law is a body of rules. I

don't think you do. You appear to
think "a body of rules" is the wrong
way to characterize it, that what you
have instead is a body of principle.
And this shows up in the issues you
submit to the courts and the vigor
and energy with which you argue
them. I suspect that deep down you
may be closer to what those
thirteenth- and fourteenth-century
judges thought they were up to than
we are.

An Insider Looks at Tax Reform
by Donald L. Korb, '73

On October 22, 1986, President
Reagan signed into law the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, which some
commentators are saying is the most
comprehensive overhaul of our fed
eral income tax system since its
inception in 1913. Since the new tax
law dramatically reduces tax rates,
repeals or restricts scores of tax
incentives written into the tax code
over the years to encourage activities
deemed economically or socially
beneficial, and makes such funda
mental changes to the law as elimi
nating (for the first time since 1921)
the tax rate differential for capital
gains, it is easy to see why it is being
billed as the most significant piece of
tax legislation in our lifetime.
From May 29, 1984, until Septem
ber 12, 1986, I served as assistant to
the commissioner of internal reve
nue. One of my responsibilities dur
ing that time was to be the overall
coordinator of the IRS's participation
in the tax reform legislative process.
This meant that I had a front-row
seat from which I could watch as
well as take part in this historic tax
reform effort. Talk about being in the
right place at the right time!

Looking back at the legislative
process now, it is a wonder to me
that the tax bill survived at all. It
came close to death many times.
Perhaps no other legislation in recent
years survived so many narrow
escapes.
Much has already been written
about the roller coaster ride that the
tax bill took from the time nearly
three years ago when President
Reagan announced in his State of the
Union message on January 25, 1984,
that he was directing his "Treasury
secretary Donald Regan to develop a
plan "to simplify the entire tax code
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so all taxpayers, big and small, are
treated more fairly."
First, there was the Treasury
Department plan developed by Secre
tary Regan which became known as
Treasury I. It was hailed by academic
tax specialists because it reduced tax
rates and abolished almost all deduc
tions, including many significant tax
breaks enjoyed by business that had
been enacted into law in 1981 at the
urging of the Reagan administration.
As might have been expected for the
kind of plan that politicians have
rejected for years, the White House
kept its distance from Treasury I.
Next came Treasury II, prepared
under the direction of the new Trea
sury secretary James Baker (the
former White House chief of staff
who switched jobs with Secretary
Regan in January 1985) and endorsed
by the president in a nationally tele
vised speech on May 28, 1985. The
new plan followed the basic outline
of Treasury I but retained more busi
ness tax breaks. Unfortunately, Trea
sury II had an almost fatal flaw: it

made too many concessions to spe
cific interests like the oil and gas
industry for the document to be
acceptable to the Democratically
controlled House of Representatives.
After formal Congressional hearings
on tax reform were held during the
summer of 1985, the House Ways
and Means Committee, chaired by
Congressman Dan Rostenkowski,
began drafting the tax bill, on Sep
tember 26, in sessions closed to the
public. Instead of using the presi
dent's proposal (Treasury II) as the
mark-up document, Rostenkowski
presented his own plan, which, while
it followed the basic structure and
outline of the president's proposal,
was more favorable to poor and mid
dle-income taxpayers and less favor
able to upper-income taxpayers and
businesses. Still, Secretary Baker,
who attended many of the mark-up
sessions himself (a most unusual step
for a Treasury secretary), worked
closely with Rostenkowski and the
other members of the Ways and
Means Committee so that a bill
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would be reported out of committee.
Baker knew that if the tax bill died in
that committee there would be no tax
reform.
Despite Rostenkowski's and Baker's
efforts, on several occasions during
the committee's mark-up process the
bill almost collapsed, only to be
revived through old-fashioned horse
trading by Rostenkowski and through
Baker's willingness to compromise
where necessary. Shortly before dawn
on November 23, 1985, their efforts
were rewarded when the Ways and
Means Committee approved the legis
lation. After a surprise procedural
attack by House Republicans on the
House floor had been overcome by
some extraordinary personal lobbying
by the president himself, the full
House of Representatives passed the
bill in mid-December.
The next step for the tax legislation
was the Senate Finance Committee—
sometimes referred to as the grave
yard of tax reform—chaired by Sena
tor Bob Packwood. Packwood (once
quoted as saying he "kinda liked the
code the way it is") came up with an
entirely new plan on March 18, 1986,
which retained many tax breaks for
business that had already been
rejected by the House, including
those for the timber industry in Packwood's home state of Oregon. But
timber was not the only industry
protected by the Packwood proposal.
In an effort to gain support for his
package from the other members of
the committee, Packwood had made
concessions throughout his proposal
to the particular interests represented
by committee members.
What followed, however, was even
worse. Over the next month of mark
up sessions, the Senate Finance Com
mittee proceeded to reject nearly
every attempt to restrict tax breaks
and, meanwhile, approved dozens of
new tax breaks for individual taxpay
ers and for businesses. Finally on
April 18 Senator Packwood, faced
with the politically embarrassing
possibility that the Republicancontrolled Senate Finance Committee
would kill a Republican president's
chief domestic policy initiative, had
to adjourn the committee's delibera
tions before his bill sank in a sea of
red ink.
At this point, Packwood decided to
go back to square one with a bold
change in strategy that he hoped
would revive his dying Jpill. He spent
the last two weeks in April working
with a small group of loyal sup
porters (often referred to as "the core
group") to develop a new plan that
would drastically cut the top individ
ual tax rate to the 27-percent range
and would end almost all tax prefer
ences, including those for capital
gains and for contributions to individ
ual retirement accounts. The new
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plan also included a provision that
would effectively abolish almost all
tax shelters by denying taxpayers the
capacity to deduct passive losses
against income from salaries, profes
sional fees, interest, and dividends.
This bill (based in large part on the
Bradley-Gephardt Fair Tax Act intro
duced by Senator Bill Bradley and
Congressman Richard Gephardt in
1982) caught the imagination of the
Senate Finance Committee's members
and passed by a 20-to-0 vote, after
only two days of debate, just after
midnight on May 7, 1986. In June,
the full Senate would approve the bill
with few amendments (thanks mainly
to a no-amendment strategy devel
oped by Packwood and Bob Dole, the
majority leader) by a vote of 97 to 3.
When the two houses of Congress
each pass a different version of a tax
bill, selected members of the two tax
writing committees meet in confer
ence to iron out the differences. The
conference to write the final version
of the tax reform bill began on July
17. For three weeks little was accom
plished. To make matters worse,
Rostenkowski and Packwood had
given the conferees a deadline: they
had to complete action on the bill
before Congress recessed for the
summer on August 15. Otherwise, it
was feared, the special interests
would be able to delay action on the
bill when the Congress returned in
September and there would be no
action before the legislators left town
in October to campaign for reelection. So time was running out.
On August 12, just three days
before the deadline, the morning
session of the conference degenerated
into a shouting match. Once again, it
looked as if the bill would die. But
that afternoon one of the conferees
suggested that the two chairman try
to hammer out a bill in private, oneon-one negotiations. After four days
and nights of marathon negotiations,
an agreement was reached. On
August 16, close to midnight—all
important votes on this bill seemed to
take place in the dead of night—the
conferees adopted a compromise bill.
The bill was eventually passed by
both houses in late September and*
was signed by the president in
October.

In my view, the reason we have a
new tax law is that four principal
players in the process were extraordi
narily persistent: President Reagan,
Secretary Baker, Congressman Ros
tenkowski, and Senator Packwood.
The president made tax reform his
number-one domestic policy issue
during his second term, and he was
able to force the Democratic leader
ship in the House of Representatives
to join him in a serious effort to

reform the tax code. Both Speaker
Tip O'Neill and Ways and Means
Chairman Rostenkowski decided it
was to their advantage to do so. They
hoped to win some of the credit for
the Democratic Party in what was
really a traditional Democratic issue
but one that had been seized by the
president for the Republicans.
The president also established one
of the most important guiding princi
ples that were to shape the contours
of the tax reform debate. He decided
that he could support and sign into
law only a tax bill that was "revenue
neutral." What this meant was that
the new tax system must raise the
same amount of revenue as the cur
rent tax system—no more, no less.
This concept of revenue neutrality
would put real discipline into the tax
reform process because it required
congressmen and senators who
wanted to create new revenue-losing
tax breaks to find ways to pay for
them either by raising tax rates or by
taking away tax benefits from other
taxpayers. Without the insistence on
revenue neutrality, there would never
have been a tax bill.
Perhaps the most dramatic single
episode in the whole process
occurred on December 16, 1985. On
December 11, House Republicans
had mounted a surprise procedural
attack and had voted overwhelmingly
(164 to 14) to reject a procedural
resolution that had to be adopted
before the actual tax bill itself could
be brought up for debate. (By con
trast, the Democrats had supported

Don Korb, '73 jLL.M., Georgetown
Universityl recently rejoined the Cleveland
firm of Thompson, Mine & Flory after two
years in Washington as assistant to the
commissioner of internal revenue, in charge
of the IRS's participation in the legislative
process that led to the Tax Reform Act
of 1986. The photo shows him looking
over the shoulder of IRS deputy
commissioner James Owens, who served
for a time as acting commissioner.

the resolution by a margin of better
than 3 to 1.) The only way to save
the bill at that point was for the pres
ident to make an extraordinary per
sonal lobbying trip to Capitol Hill.
On December 16 he met with House
Republicans in an effort to persuade
enough of them to change their votes
so that the bill could be approved by
the House and the tax reform process
could move on to the Senate. He
promised them that he would veto
the bill if it arrived on his desk with
out significant changes, but he urged
them to vote for it to keep the pro
cess alive. The next day the House
approved the bill by a voice vote
after a motion to kill it was rejected,
256 to 171. The president had per
suaded 34 Republicans to switch
their votes, and that was the differ
ence between victory and defeat.
Secretary Baker also played a key
role. He was responsible for taking
Treasury I—a purist, academic, politi
cally unrealistic document—and turn
ing it into the much more politicallyviable Treasury II. He was also the
administration's legislative tactician.
He maneuvered the bill through
Congress by knowing when to make
compromises and when to hold firm
for the president's principles.
Congressman Rostenkowski was
astute enough to realize that if he did
not report a tax bill out of the Ways
and Means Committee the Demo
cratic Party could end up being
labeled as opponents of tax reform.
He saw the need to Join with Presi
dent Reagan and work with the
Republican administration in what
was a traditional Democratic stance
against tax loopholes.
It was also Rostenkowski who
managed to avert a disaster for the
bill during the closed mark-up in his
committee in mid-October 1985.
After days of minor changes and
nibbling around the edges, the Ways
and Means Committee, faced with its
first vote on a controversial issue,
caved in and—against the chairman's
strong desire—approved an important
tax break for banks. The lobbyists in
the hallway outside the committee
room—known as Gucci Gulch in
honor of the footwear that many of
them favored—were ecstatic. Ros
tenkowski was furious.
Some analysts pronounced the bill
dead at that point: the vote on the
bank issue, they said, showed that
Congress was unwilling to take on
the powerful special interests. Ros
tenkowski had other ideas. He
stopped the mark-up for more than a
week and he set about trading favors
for votes. For example, he agreed
with one group of members to sup
port continued federal tax deductions
for state income and sales taxes. With
another group he agreed not to argue
for the taxation of employee fringe

benefits. In return for his support for
those items and for a host of smaller
issues important to particular mem
bers' constituents, he demanded the
members' support for the overall bill.
The committee reconvened and voted
to overturn its decision of the pre
vious week. The tax break for banks
went out the window, and the legisla
tion was back on track.
Finally, Bob Packwood saved tax
reform with his revolutionary pro
posal last May. If he had not come up
with his modified flat-tax proposal
when he did, the bill would surely
have died in the Senate Finance Com
mittee. And Packwood knew when to
compromise. The unanimous 20-to-0
vote in the Senate Finance Commit
tee is a little misleading because
there had not even been a majority
for the bill before a last-minute
change allowing certain oil and gas
interests to be excluded from the
passive-loss rule applicable to all
other tax shelters. Faced with a
choice between no bill and a bill with
the extra tax advantage for oil and
gas exploration, Packwood knew he
had to compromise and he did
exactly that.

In conclusion, whether you are for
or against tax reform, you have those
four men either to thank or to blame.
You also can either thank or blame,
as the case may be, the following key
strategic decisions:
• The concept of revenue neutrality.
Without it, there would have been no
tax bill. This was particularly true in
the Senate. The Senate began its
debate with an agreement to require
that all amendments be revenueneutral, and that provided an unusual
amount of discipline to that normally
unruly body.
• The closed-door sessions of the
Ways and Means Committee. Outside
the glare of the public eye, the com
mittee was able to deal openly with
the elimination of many favorite tax
preferences in a way that would have
been impossible in open sessions.
• The two-day blitz by Packwood II.
Caught off guard by Senator Packwood's revolutionary proposal in
early May, the lobbyists were never
able to recover. Had the bill been
debated longer, it might have been
reported out of the Senate Finance
Committee in quite a different form—
if it had been reported out at all.
• The no-amendment strategy on the
Senate floor. Most analysts agreed that
the key feature of the revised Packwood bill was the low tax rates.
There was a fear that if the bill were
amended on the Senate floor, by
adding a deduction that would cause
tax rates to rise, support for the bill
could evaporate. The no-amendment

strategy passed its toughest test
when, by the narrow margin of 51 to
48, the Senate rejected an amend
ment to continue the deduction for
contributions to individual retirement
accounts. Had this amendment
passed, the fate of the bill clearly
would have been in doubt.
• The private negotiations of the two
chairmen. Senate and House con
ferees were as far apart after three
weeks of conference as they had
been on the first day. Only one-onone private negotiations between
Congressman Rostenkowski and
Senator Packwood could produce a
compromise bill. And that is exactly
what happened.

During my service in Washington, I
maintained my residence in Cleve
land, commuting home about every
other weekend.
Soon after Senator Packwood had
pulled his first bill off the table, my
wife asked me, during one of our
long-distance phone calls, when I
thought the Senate Finance Commit
tee would finish its work and report
out a tax bill so I could end my
Washington assignment and come
home to Cleveland for good. I
remember telling her that night,
"There is about as much chance of
getting a bill out of the Senate
Finance Committee right now as
there is of the Cleveland Indians'
being in first place."
Those of you who no longer have
the sports pages from your daily
paper for May 7, 1986—the day of
the 20-to-0 vote in the Senate Finance
Committee—might wonder who was
in first place that day. The Cleveland
Indians, of course.
Luckily for tax reform, the tax bill
proved to have greater staying power
than the Indians did.

Focus on Academe
by Wilbur C. Leatherberry, '68
Professor of Law

We have recently refined our
alumni computer records to include
information about legal specialty. In
doing that we confirmed what we
had long believed: that there is a
large, diverse, and interesting group
of our alumni in law teaching.
Laura Chisolm, '80, and I are now
the only regular law faculty members
at Case Western Reserve who gradu
ated from this law school. Peter Joy,
'77, and Kenneth Margolis, '76,
teach in our clinical program (and
Margolis is director of continuing
legal education], and Elizabeth
Barker Brandt, '82, and Kathryn
Sords Mercer, '83, are research and
writing instructors. Daniel Clancy,
'62, is the school's vice dean and
director of the Center for Criminal
Justice.
Many other graduates have chosen
the academic life. Here is a hopefully
representative sample of that group.

Seven of the Law School's faculty are its graduates: Dan Clancy, Liz Brandt, Peter Joy, and
Katy Mercer (standing); Ken Margolis, Bill Leatherberry, Laura Chisolm (seated).

emeritus status in 1980. He and his
wife, Elizabeth, returned for the
fiftieth reunion of his graduating
class last fall. He describes that
reunion as "the only alumni reunion
I ever attended" and says that they
both enjoyed it enormously.

Let us begin with a dean. J. Nor
man McDonough, '36, LL.M. '37,
began teaching in 1937 as a teaching
fellow at New York University School
of Law. From there he went to Loy
ola of Los Angeles for a one-year stint
and then left teaching for other work,
including service in the Air Force
during World War II. He returned to
Cleveland to join the law faculty here
in 1947. He "fathered." .pur law
review—serving as the faculty adviser
in its first few years of existence. In
1953 he accepted the opportunity to
become the dean at St. Louis Univer
sity School of Law. Leaving here was
"a tough decision," he says, because
he enjoyed teaching and had devel
oped close friends on the faculty. He
served as dean at St. Louis from 1953
to 1962 and then went back to full
time teaching there until he retired to
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The largest delegation of our gradu
ates at a single law school is the trio
at the University of Toledo. My class
mate, Frank S. Merritt, '68, special
izes in courses in criminal law and
criminal procedure including an
intriguing course called Corporate,
Organized, and White Collar Crime.
He is working on an article, "The
Limits of Electronic Incarceration,"
which will be published in Criminal
Justice Magazine. He explains that
electronic incarceration means the

use of electronic devices to track the
whereabouts of convicts who are
allowed to live at home and go to
work.

James M. Klein, '69, and Robin
M. Kennedy, '70, are co-directors of
the College of Law Legal Clinic.
Klein has returned tp Toledo after
spending the last academic year as a
visiting professor at the University of
New Mexico. He just finished an
article on the unemployment insur
ance program of the Federal Republic
of Germany. He and his wife toured
Germany for the research. Since he
speaks no German and she is fluent
because of her German heritage, she
served as his interpreter. He is now
applying for grants to make a similar
study of a recently enacted unem-

ployment compensation system in the
People's Republic of China and, yes,
his wife is now learning Mandarin
Chinese. In addition, Klein has been
preparing annual supplements for
Professor Sidney Jacoby's Ohio Civil
Practice Manual. He and two co
authors are hard at work on a new
book which Banks-Baldwin will pub
lish to replace Jacoby's. Professor
Jacoby was Klein's Civil Procedure
teacher, and Klein says he "really
liked him." It is appropriate that one
of Jacoby's students is carrying on his
work.

Kennedy is principally involved in
clinical teaching. He supervises stu
dents in practice, teaches a course
called Interviewing, Counseling and
Negotiating, and gets involved in
cases in his specialty, legal aspects of
mental illness. He also teaches
Administrative Law and expects to
teach Constitutional Law next year.

Richard D. Balnave, '77, and
Patricia Mell, '78, are also involved
in clinical teaching—at Virginia and
Delaware, respectively. Like many
clinicians, Balnave worked in a feder
ally supported legal services program.
Legal Services of Northeastern Penn
sylvania, from 1977-80. He left that
program and went into private prac
tice in the same city, Wilkes-Barre,

for a few years before taking the
teaching position at Virginia in 1984.
He runs the Family Law Clinic in
which students spend one semester
of classroom time preparing for fam
ily law practice and then one semes
ter practicing as interns. This spring
he will run the Criminal Practice
Workshop, a simulation course in
which the twelve students will simu
late all of the legal proceedings
involved in an airline hijacking case
from the initial charges through trial.
Local practitioners will assist in
supervising the students as they play
roles as prosecutors and defense
counsel. A federal magistrate and a
federal judge will play the judicial
roles.
Immediately after her graduation,
Mell went to work in the office of
the Ohio attorney general. In four
and a half years there she got valu
able trial and appellate experience
including arguing two cases in the
Ohio Supreme Court. She began
teaching in the clinical program at
Capital and then moved to Toledo,
where she expanded the Toledo trio
into a quartet for one year. She is
now in her first semester of teaching
at Delaware Law School. The school
is the only one in the state and runs
both a day and a night program. She
is teaching Criminal Law, Business
Organizations, and Consumer Law.
Her experience in the Consumer
Frauds and Crimes Unit of the Attor
ney General's office is particularly
valuable in the Consumer Law class.
One of her colleagues at Delaware is
Mary Brigid McManamon, who ear
lier had a stint at Case Western
Reserve as a research and writing
instructor.

teachers to teach research and writ
ing and some regular courses, gives
them a two-year commitment,
arranges for experienced teachers to
visit their classes and provide helpful
comments, and then pledges to assist
them in finding teaching positions
elsewhere at the end of the two
years. Pendergrass will be teaching
Administrative Law this spring and
summer. Next fall he will teach a
course on hazardous wastes, trading
on experience as an environmental
lawyer in the U. S. Department of
the Interior and in private practice in
Madison, Wisconsin. He reports:
"Teaching is fun—so far."

David A. Funk, '51, LL.M., '72,
began teaching at Indiana University
(Indianapolis) in 1973 after more than
twenty years in practice in Wooster,
Ohio, where he was a partner in the
firm of Funk & Funk. Interestingly,
he teaches "perspective" courses like
Jurisprudence, World Legal History,
and Sociology of Law, rather than
substantive law courses with an obvi
ous relation to his practice experi
ence. He also teaches Professional
Responsibility, a course in which his
practice experience must provide a
wealth of material. He is the author
of Group Dynamic Law: Integrating
Constitutive Contract Institutions, a
book in which he surveys ways in
which our laws influence cooperation
and conflict among people in groups.
Professor Funk is the uncle of a
recent graduate of this law school,
Laura Funk Shunk, '83. He is now
completing work on an article on
world legal history.

Jay Pendergrass, '79, is a recent
convert to the teaching profession.
He began this fall as a visiting assis
tant professor at Chicago-Kent Law
School of the Illinois Institute of
Technology. The school hires young
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nal Procedure. He is working on an
article about the constitutional right
to confrontation. He proudly reports
that he was the recipient of the
Excellence in Teaching Award at
Wake Forest in both 1983 and 1985.

Richard G. Bell, '51, LL.M. '61,
one of David Funk's classmates,
teaches at Wake Forest. He did his
first year of law school at Kentucky,
where it counted as his final year of
study for his A.B. degree, and then
came here for the last two years. He
practiced in a small firm in Bedford,
Ohio, for fourteen years and com
pleted his LL.M. degree while in
practice. He began teaching at Wake
Forest in 1965. After twenty years in
teaching he took a leave last year and
spent the time in private practice
working on some interesting and
important matters in estate planning.
In addition to the estates course he
teaches commercial law courses.
Besides law review articles, he has
written several student study aids for
the Cambridge Law Studies series.
He says he enjoys the natural beauty
of the Winston-Salem area and
reports that he plays golf all year
round.

Charles Preston Rose, Jr., '67, is
a colleague of Richard Bell at Wake
Forest. He began teaching while in
the Army JAG Corps and joined the
faculty at Akron University upon
leaving the service. He finds the
ambience at Wake very much like
that of his alma mater: warm and
friendly with faculty very open and
accessible to students. His principal
courses are Criminal Law and Crimi
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There is another Rose in teaching.
Michael D. Rose, '63, is a tax pro
fessor at Ohio State. After three years
in practice, he went to Columbia
University for his LL.M. He has been
teaching at Ohio State since 1973 and
has visited at Minnesota (1974-75)
and Florida (1978-79). Like most tax
teachers he has been quite busy
because of all of the recent tax
reform activity. He is an editor of
West's Selected Tax Statutes, Code and
Regulations, a publication which has
had to undergo several major revi
sions in the last few years. He has
written material for the Bureau of
National Affairs' Tax Management
Portfolio series and is working on a
tax hornbook for West and a chapter
of a book on estate planning.

Harold R. Weinberg, '69, is
Alumni Professor at Kentucky. He
took, and liked, all of Professor
Shanker's commercial law courses at
the law school and is now following
in his footsteps as a commercial law
teacher. He just finished a chapter on
documents of title for a Matthew

Bender treatise on debtor-creditor
law. He spent three years in practice
with the Cleveland firm of Ulmer,
Berne, Laronge, Glickman & Curtis
before entering the academic world
as a writing instructor at the Univer
sity of Illinois in 1971-72. He moved
to Kentucky the following year. He
provided expert counsel to the Ken
tucky legislature, which just recently
got around to enacting the 1972
amendments to the Uniform Com
mercial Code, and he drafted some
non-uniform amendments which
were enacted at that time.

Another of Professor Shanker's
students, Ralph Anzivino, '71, is
teaching commercial law and bank
ruptcy at Marquette University. He
joined the law faculty there after five
years' practice with the Cleveland
firm of Parks, Eisele, Lawrence &
Bates. He has just completed two
major writing projects. His book.
Partner and Partnership Bankruptcies,

will be published this month. He also
co-authored, with Professor William
Hawkland, a chapter of Hawkland's
Uniform Commercial Code Series.
The chapter deals with UCC Article
7—warehouse receipts and bills of
lading. Frequently appointed as a
trustee in Chapter 11 bankruptcy
reorganizations, Anzivino is now
serving as trustee in the largest such
bankruptcy in the history of Wiscon
sin. He loves his work as an aca
demic, though. He says: "We still
have the best jobs in the country."
Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., '74, studied
corporate and securities law with
Professor Ron Coffey and later taught
Corporations at the University of
Wisconsin. He reports that my col
league Juliet Kostritsky was in his
7:45 a.m. class in his first year of
teaching. That winter was dark and
dismal, he remembers. The class was
composed of the "gunners" who
arrived on time and sat in the first
row and the "others" who arrived
late and sat the the last few rows—

with no one in between. Of course,
Professor Kostritsky was one of the
gunners. After a clerkship with Judge
Richard H. Chambers of the Ninth
Circuit, Davis practiced at Covington
& Burling in Washington for three
years. Unlike most academics, he did
not go through the "meat market"
hiring process. He never registered in
the roster of persons seeking teaching
positions and did not go to the Chi
cago meeting at which candidates are
interviewed. While in practice he
decided to take a year and try teach
ing. He wrote to a few schools,
including Wisconsin, in January,
1978, and was interviewed and hired
for the following school year. He
spent last year as a visitor at
U.C.L.A. His article, "Judicial
Review of Fiduciary Decisionmak
ing—Some Theoretical Perspectives"
was just published in 80 Northwestern
University Law Review 1. In his early
years, Davis taught contracts but he
now teaches only in the business
associations and securities law fields.
Davis's class of 1974 also produced
David H. Kessler and Margery
Malkin Koosed, who are now fac
ulty colleagues at Akron University.
Koosed arrived first at Akron,
although both entered the teaching
field immediately after graduation.
Kessler began at Ohio Northern Uni
versity and stayed there for three and
a half years before leaving to join a
friend in practice for six months in
California. He then went to the Uni
versity of Florida, where he did his
LL.M. in taxation, and then served as
a judicial clerk (officially called an

attorney-advisor] in the U. S. Tax
Court for two years. He describes
that experience as "extremely posi
tive" and says that it "added a
dimension to his teaching." He
returned to teaching when he
accepted his present position at
Akron in 1983. In addition to his tax
courses he teaches contracts and
serves as a consultant to the Tax
Litigation Clinic.

Koosed developed a strong interest
in criminal law and procedure in her
classes with Professor Lewis Katz and
now teaches such courses herself.
Her principal research interest is the
subject of capital punishment. She is
a member of the Ohio Public
Defender Commission and chaired
the committee that drafted regula
tions setting out qualifications for
lawyers to be appointed to represent
indigents in capital cases. She con
sults frequently in capital cases and

just completed work, with two other
lawyers, on an amicus brief in the
case of State v. Martin which will be
decided this term by the United
States Supreme Court. The argument
concerns the allocation of the burden
of proof of self-defense to the defend
ant, an issue she first analyzed sev
eral years ago for a clinic case.
Evelyn Ginsberg Abravanel, '75,
served as a research assistant to Pro
fessor Paul Haskell while she was a
student here. She is now teaching
Property, Estates, and Wills and
Trusts at American University, where
Marcia Murphy, a member of our
faculty from 1977-1983, is a col
league. Abravanel finds it hard to
believe, she says, that she has been
teaching for ten years. She went to
Washington right after graduation to
work for Shaw, Pittman, Potts &
Trowbridge, then a 40-person law
firm, which now has over 150 law
yers. She is in her second year of
chairing the Admissions Committee
(she says "unfortunately") and was
on a dean search committee a few
years ago. Her current project is an
article on spendthrift trusts.
There you have a sampling of our
graduates in the teaching profession.
We could call them our "shadow
faculty" or, perhaps, our "faculty-inwaiting." However we refer to them,
these graduates are making signifi
cant contributions to the law and to
the legal profession. Both their teach
ers and their fellow alumni have
reason to be proud of them.

20 Years of Library Service

Helen Brazynetz recently completed her 20th
year on the staff of the law library. Members
of her family joined the Law School's faculty
and staff for a celebration, and one of Peter
Gerhart's first official acts as dean was this
presentation.
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The Year of the Presidents:
A Retrospective
by Mary Beth Breckenridge
Contributing Editor
everyone knows by now, in 1985-86 the
nation's two largest bar associations were
both headed by graduates of the Case West
ern Reserve University School of Law: Wil
liam W. Falsgraf '58, was president of the
American Bar Association, and his counter
part at the National Bar Association was
Fred D. Gray, '54. Just before they began
their term in office. In Brief talked with
them both about the upcoming year (Septem
ber issue, 1985j. For the current issue we
asked them to look back on the experience,
and to tell us what it is like to come back
down from the mountain.
-K.E.T.

Ask Fred Gray and Bill Falsgraf
about the past year, and they'll talk
in enthusiastic terms: Fascinating.
Intensive. Enjoyable. And exhausting.
"It was a good experience. I really
enjoyed it. But it's good to have it
over with," says Gray, and Falsgraf’s
sentiments are almost an echo.
Both ended their presidencies satis
fied that they left the organization
stronger and that they had worked to
advance the causes of minorities and
to promote national policy debate in
the United States and abroad.
For Gray, the primary concerns of
the past year were long-term ones:
promoting blacks within the legal
profession and seeking solutions to
the problems that plague the black
community. In keeping with those
priorities, his year as president cen
tered on the theme "Partners in
Unity—the Black Lawyer and the
Black Community."
"What we wanted to do was join
hands with other organizations inter
ested in improving the black commu
nity. I feel that black lawyers should
be a part of the community and
should be willing to give back to the
community," says Gray, who has
made his career in Alabama. Fie is
now a partner in the Tuskegee firm
of Gray, Langford, Sapp, Davis &
McGowan.
Under Gray, the National Bar Asso
ciation made concerted efforts in that
direction. At its three national meet
ings and its annual convention the
association presented Fe^al education
seminars that focused on such topics
as drugs, economic development, and
voting rights. The NBA lobbied legis
lators on issues affecting blacks, and
representatives met with U.S. attor
ney general Edwin Meese and with
the chairman of the National Republi
can Committee to stress the need for
more black federal judges.
Gray also extended the organiza
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tion's battle for black opportunity to
the struggle against South African
apartheid, urging NBA members to
push for the imposition of meaning
ful sanctions against the South Afri
can government.
Likewise, under Ealsgraf the Ameri
can Bar Association continued efforts
to increase the involvement of
women and minority members in the
association's leadership. One-third of
Falsgraf's appointments were women
or minorities, he says, and he encour
aged the ABA's sections and other
subgroups to follow his lead. He
thinks that there is still a way to go
in that direction, but, he says, "It's
already had an impact. And over the
years I expect it to have a significant
impact."
Perhaps the most exciting aspect of
Gray's and Falsgraf's presidencies
was their involvement in interna
tional affairs. The year saw Falsgraf
squaring off with former Soviet for
eign minister Andrei Gromyko over
human rights and Gray making an
impact on the fate of persons
involved in an attempted coup in
Liberia.
Falsgraf's confrontation with Gro
myko happened in June, when a
delegation of ABA members traveled
to the Soviet Union to talk with
Soviet officials about such concerns
as the persecution of Soviet Jews,
emigration policies, and the fairness
of the Soviet legal system.
At one meeting Falsgraf, as head of
the American delegation, found him
self seated directly across the confer
ence table from Gromyko. "I was
very frank with him," he recalls. "I
told him how upset we were" with
the Soviets' record on human rights.
Though Falsgraf calls that visit
"one of the highlights of the year," he
stops short of attributing any substan
tial changes in Soviet policy to the
ABA's efforts. "Whether those types
of exchanges of information lead to
any tangible benefits is Hard to tell,"
he says. "But it's certainly worth the
effort, because if you don't make the
effort nothing ever changes."
One of Gray's proudest memories
of his presidency is his sojourn in
Monrovia, Liberia, in February and
March. At the request of the ABA's
Section on Human Rights and
Responsibilities, he observed the trial
of four defendants charged with
treason in the attempted overthrow
of the Liberian government in 1985.
The ABA had reason to believe that

the defendants were wrongly
charged, and so sent Gray to observe
and report on the proceedings.
The trial was farcical by American
standards. It resulted in a hung jury,
but the judge ordered the jurors to
return to deliberations. Nine refused,
and three later maintained that they
were coerced into the eventual guilty
verdict.
Gray was one among several
observers, who represented such
organizations as Amnesty Interna
tional and the newspaper group Free
Expression. Their presence appar
ently had an impact. After the trial
Liberian President Samuel K. Doe
granted clemency to the four defend
ants and to all others who had been
arrested as a result of the attempted
coup.
During their presidencies Falsgraf
and Gray addressed other issues as
well. For Falsgraf and the ABA these
included extensive study of the tort
insurance crisis, particularly in the
area of medical malpractice; consider
ation of legal measures to combat
international terrorism; and an
increasing effort, through contact
with legal groups in Central and
South American countries, to
strengthen their legal systems and
lessen their political turmoil.
Much of Gray's efforts focused on
strengthening the NBA. A fundraising
campaign and increased membership
averted a financial crisis. Under his
leadership the NBA completed a
directory of black lawyers, which
Gray hopes will improve communica
tion, and the association purchased a
headquarters building in Washington,
D.C.
Pursuing these goals meant count
less hours on the road for both presi
dents. Falsgraf figures that he aver
aged only one day a week at his
Baker & Hostetler office in Cleve
land. Gray estimates that he covered
more than 100,000 miles.
Both men seem happy to kick off
their traveling shoes, get out of the
limelight, and settle down again to
less hectic routines. Both are still
active in their organizations, but both
are happy to resume their careers.
Fred Gray, who has been meaning
for years to write a book about his
life as a civil rights lawyer, says he
may finally put pen to paper—but
don't rush right away to your book
store.

Whatever happened to .. .

Richard E. Guster
1955 Student of the Year

The plaque in the Law School's
lower rotunda that displays the
names of winners of the Student of
the Year award, given annually "for
outstanding scholarship and excel
lence in extracurricular activities,"
begins in 1955 with Richard Evans
Guster. He comments, with a selfeffacement that is characteristic, "By
no means do I think I was an Ezio
Pinza, creating the role of Student of
the Year." But he remembers that he
was "extremely pleased" to hear his
name announced that night at the
dinner downtown, and that his own
pleasure "was exceeded only by the
joy of my parents and my future
wife, Sharlee, who were there with
me."
Dick Ouster's family lived in Can
ton, and he started school there, but
he finished at a military academy in
Wisconsin. Someone has suggested
that that may explain the rigorous
self-discipline that has marked his
career. He went on to Denison Uni
versity, joined a Marine reserve pro
gram, and was commissioned shortly
after his graduation in 1950—just in
time for the Korean war. But—"inex
plicably"—he was sent not to Korea
but to cruise around the Mediterra
nean. "I was probably," he says, "the
most highly trained and well-traveled
noncombatant the Marine Corps has
ever had."
Guster had been a pre-med student
at Denison, but "with no burning
desire to become a doctor," and he
credits the Marines for his interest in
the law: "I was thrown in with a lot

of lawyers, and I got intrigued." He
enrolled at Western Reserve—"I
decided I had been away from home
long enough"—and made the transi
tion "from a scientific to a philo
sophic curriculum. There was a fasci
nation in that—maybe even a certain
terror."
Nevertheless, Guster has fond
memories of his law school years:
"The school was small, we all knew
one another, and we had a great mix
of people. I made great friendships. I
got to know the faculty; Sam Sonenfield was a dear friend, and so were
Ollie Schroeder and Bob Bensing.
Dean Andrews was an absolute gem,
such an inspiration—he was every
thing a lawyer could hope to be.” He
adds: "But I've had good experiences
everywhere. I consider myself a child
of good fortune."
Guster attributes his selection as
Student of the Year to the fact that he
was "involved in as many things as
you could be involved in—Law
Review, moot court, Phi Delta Phi—
though I don't know that I did any of
them especially well." Others would
disagree with that assessment. Bens
ing remembers him as "a student
who always seemed to be prepared.
He was very quiet—but you couldn't
miss him because he was so tall!" His
classmates remember him as a good
student, universally popular. As
Schroeder puts it, "You'd expect him
to be Student of the Year."
Although he "kinda thought I'd go
back to Canton," Guster heard of an
interesting opening in Akron, inter

viewed, got the offer, and joined the
firm that now is known as Roetzel &
Andress. "It was a great opportunity,"
he says, "and, again, I was a child of
fortune: within a month after I was
sworn in I was involved in a case
that went all the way to the U.S.
Supreme Court. It was the first case
of any real consequence that I had
worked on. That was a real thrill."
Guster joined the firm as its twelfth
man. Now, he says, "I don't feel
ancient by any means, but I guess
I'm the most senior of the fully active
partners." He has spent his career as
a litigator, starting with "a lot of
personal injury work, insurance
defense," and going on to complex
patent litigation, securities, environ
mental matters, and such products
liability cases as those stemming
from the Beverly Hills, MGM, and
Air Canada fires. "The numbers
boggle the mind," he says; "there is
such an awesome potential for liabil
ity. In a way it is glorified extortion—
but of course I say that as a defend
ant's lawyer."
Outside of his practice, he has done
more than his share of civic endeav
ors: his resume details such involve
ments as St. Thomas Hospital, the
Akron Child Guidance Center, and
the Visiting Nurse Service, and he
has been president of the Akron City
Club and Portage Country Club. But
perhaps what is closest to his heart is
golf. He has been president of the
Akron Golf Charities, general chair
man (in 1972) of the American Golf
Classic, and general chairman (in
1975) of the P.G.A. of America Cham
pionship. His wife was responsible
for his getting involved in those tour
nament activities, and they share a
common interest in the game.
Dick Guster is an avid golfer: "I
love the game, though I'm afraid I
don't contribute much to it.” At
times he looks forward to retirement
years when he may at last be able to
get in as much golfing time as he
would like, but he fears that he
would simply "prove conclusively
that I'm a lousy golfer." So he also
thinks about writing—"and it might
be fun to teach."
Guster's younger colleagues will
assure you that he has done a lot of
teaching already. Craig Marvinney
(who, by the way, was Student of the
Year in 1982) began his career at
Roetzel & Andress and left there only
recently. "Dick Guster taught me
much of what I know now," he says.
"Mainly he taught me a technical and
extremely thorough approach to liti-

gation. Even though he is tremen
dously respected, and carries a repu
tation that stretches across the
country, he is always approachable,
and he's always willing to stop what
he's doing and take time to be help
ful."
Tom Parker, '79, spent a summer
clerkship with the firm and returned
to a permanent position. Although
Parker thought he wanted to attach
himself to the firm's corporate side,
he was turned over to Guster and the
litigators. "Dick Guster took me
under his wing," he says, "and I
guess I'm still there and still learning
from him. We worked on the MGM
case together, and he made me into a
lawyer while we did it."
Guster's teaching method, says
Parker, typically is "to turn to the
young associate in the courtroom and
say: 'You do the opening statement.'
He is not one to insist that you watch
him do it a hundred times and then
do it his way." Guster has told Parker
and others that his greatest satisfac

tion in the practice is in helping
young attorneys get to be better law
yers than he is.
Parker echoes Marvinney on the
"uniform respect" that Guster enjoys
in the profession. Early in his career
Parker went with Guster before a
legendarily tough federal judge in
Cleveland; after that experience,
Parker says, he was startled by the
discovery that the judge did not treat
all lawyers with the same deference
he accorded Dick Guster.
From Parker, In Brief learned that
Guster is a near-pro plumber and
electrician, and that "he probably has
a secret ambition to be a furniture
maker." Parker thinks "the guy can
do anything."
Above all, both Parker and Marvin
ney speak warmly about Guster's
concern for his firm's young associ
ates and their families. His own son,
Timothy, is an associate with the
firm, but Guster is a father to others
besides. He worries about whether
his younger colleagues are spending

enough time at home. He is, says
Parker, "the associates' true ally—he's
just a good man."
As befits a patriarch, Guster is
quietly proud of his law firm. He
enjoys showing a visitor around the
former public library that is now the
Roetzel & Andress headquarters,
pointing out, around the frieze, "our
former partners—Shakespeare,
Chaucer, Herodotus . . . ." He is
pleased that they've opened satellite
offices in Canton and Columbus.
Dick Guster's echoing theme is that
he is a "fortunate" man. Concluding
the interview, he said: "I really have
been blessed in my opportunities. I
feel fortunate to be a lawyer and to
have been entrusted with the matters
that have been placed with me. I
can't think of a more exciting profes
sion. And I can't imagine any activity
that reaps the benefit of hard work as
much as ours does."
-K.E.T.

1986 Distinguished Recent Graduate

James R. Strawn, '76
When Jim Strawn learned that he
had been selected as the 1986 recipi
ent of the Alumni Association's
award to a distinguished recent grad
uate, he was not at all sure that he
could be at the Law School to receive
it. The Saturday of Alumni Weekend
happened to be the date of the Cor
porate Cup in Canton, Ohio, and
Strawn was captain of his law firm's
swim team, which had narrowly
missed first place in 1985 and was
counting on him for a victory in '86.
Frantic efforts were made to
resolve the conflict—including calls to
a helicopter service, which might
have delivered Strawn (presumably
still dripping) to the roof of nearby
University Hospitals. Fortunately, it
proved possible to re-schedule the
swimming events for an earlier hour,
and Strawn managed to squeeze both
his obligations into that Saturday
morning,without having to take to
the air.
The point of the story is that Jim
Strawn takes seriously—VERY seri
ously—his obligation to his commu
nity. Although he satisfies all the
stated criteria as a Distinguished
Recent Graduate—1) he is a more
than competent practitioner, 2) he is
active in professional organizations,
and 3) as regional vice president he is
active in law alumni affairs—his clear
preeminence is in 4) community
service.
Fundamental to Strawn's involve
ment in the Canton community has
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been his active (and that is an under
statement) membership in the Jaycees. He set a record for longevity on
the local organization's board, serving
in successive years as legal counsel,
vice president, secretary, state direc
tor, executive vice president, president, and chairman. He has served as
the state organization's legal counsel
and as metropolitan chapter director,
and he is presently secretary, legal
counsel, and trustee of its Charitable
and Educational Fund. Along the
way, in 1981, he picked up the Gene
Wayne Childress Award as the out
standing Jaycee in Ohio.
Strawn describes the Jaycee organi
zation as a "training ground" in lead
ership and a "stepping stone” into
other activities. "You develop con
tacts, you show what you can do,
you use what you've gained, and at
age 36 they throw you out and you
go on to other things." He adds: "I'm
close to being thrown out."
One stepping stone was Strawn's
chairmanship of the Jaycee Summerfest in 1984. That was such a success
that the Chamber of Commerce
involved him in planning some event
to increase downtown activity in
conjunction with the football Hall of
Fame weekend. Shamelessly (he
admits it) borrowing from Cleveland,
he came up with the idea of a Ribs
Burn-Off. By now, largely through
Strawn's efforts, it is securely estab
lished as an annual event.
Another of his projects has been
the renovation of Canton's downtown
Palace Theater, once slated for demo
lition but now refurbished and func
tioning as a civic and cultural center.
That began with Jaycees' efforts, but
other groups were drawn into the
enterprise. Strawn enthusiastically
tours a visitor through the Canton
downtown, pointing out all the com
ponents of the city's ongoing renais
sance, and clearly evidencing a feel
ing of proprietorship and a sense of
responsibility for the city's welfare.
Perhaps Strawn is proudest of the
renovation of Canton's Stadium Park,
a project which he conceived, orga
nized, and has very nearly brought to
completion. Strawn and his cohorts
secured a $300,000 commitment from
the Timken Foundation and then
raised another $16,700 from private
sources; the city has contributed an
estimated $15,000 in resources and
manpower. A major part of the proj
ect has been the installation of an allweather track, with twenty exercise
stations. Strawn reports with obvious
delight: "Any time of the day, you see
hundreds of people on it. You can
barely get on the track! There are just
two complaints: one, it's too
crowded, and two, it's not lit. Well,
the lighting will be up in about three
weeks!"
Now that that's about finished,
Strawn is shoulder-deep in another

project, along with his wife Barbara.
He explains how it happened: "Two
years ago, in Indianapolis, we went
to the children's museum just on a
whim. We spent two full days there!
We got back home, and I told some
one in the office about it, and he
said, 'Why don't you get involved
with the one in Canton?' I said,
'WHAT one in Canton?'
"Within a month Barbara and I
were both on the board of the Chil
dren's Museum of Northeast Ohio.
They were undergoing a transition,
trying to find a facility and funding; I
had just done the funding for the
track, and so I had the sources. Over
the next six months we got the Chil
dren's Museum merged with the
Stark County Historical Society, and
by now we have enough funding to
get the museum off the ground. It's
probably the quickest start of a chil
dren's museum in the country. We
hope to have it open by the end of
the school year."
As that suggests, Barbara Strawn
has had her own share of community
activities. One gathers that the Junior
League has had a place in her life
similar to the Jaycees' place in her
husband's. All of this has made for
what Jim describes as "an intense
lifestyle," but, as he explains it: "I
think the family as a unit has to
make a certain contribution to the
community—to improve it for our
own sake, and for our children's
sake. When I was even more civically active, and was home maybe
one night every three or four weeks,
and we were trying to think how that
might be improved, Barbara and I
struck a deal: if she would increase
her involvement, I would decrease
mine."
Both Strawn's wife and his law
firm (Black, McCuskey Souers &
Arbaugh) have been remarkably
tolerant of his extracurricular pur
suits, and even encouraging. In fact,
as Strawn explains it, he got into a
number of civic and charitable activi
ties because, when he first joined the
firm, there was a five-year hiring gap
and he was one of only two associ
ates: "Every partner had a pet proj
ect, and only two of us were avail
able. So every month I'd get called
on for something or other."
According to Strawn, he got into
law in the first place because "I was
never at a loss for words, and I get
along well with people. I've always
been a people person." Not surpris
ingly, he has mainly developed a
practice in labor law; he estimates
that that accounts for 75 percent of
his professional time. "I also do liti
gation," he adds, "especially in the
oil and gas area. And I do some
domestic relations. The analogy there
is that labor relations and domestic
relations are similar. They both
involve compromise and negotia-

tion—and occasional litigation."
Strawn remembers that when he
first began with the firm as a clerk
his younger brother had a factory job
with one of the firm's clients, and the
employees were out on strike. "So all
day long I'd hear about injunctions
and restricting the pickets, and then
I'd go home and hear the other side
about management's mistreatment of
the employees. It was a personal
exposure to the issues.
"What sets labor law off from other
areas is that you have to maintain the
ability to work with the person
you're facing in an adversarial situa
tion. He's across from you at the
arbitration table, but he'll be back on
the job the next day. You have to
respect each other's positions."
As Strawn has become more senior
in the firm, he is continuing the pat
tern of encouraging the firm's associ
ates to get involved in community
endeavors. One gathers that a new
hire doesn't have a great deal of
choice about whether or not to join
the Jaycees! And woe to the hapless
young person who pleads, "I'm too
busy." Strawn says: "The biggest
thing I've preached to younger peo
ple in the office is that you don't
know what your capacity is, either
for work or for other projects, unless
you extend yourself and find out
what your limit really is. Busy people
usually get beyond their capacity and
then have to pull back. I know I've
probably exceeded my capacity on a
few occasions."
What makes it all worthwhile for
Jim Strawn is the gratifying feeling
that his efforts in the Canton commu
nity have really made a difference.
"I've tried to be involved in areas
that aren't exactly traditional—things
that, without my involvement,
wouldn't get accomplished. Some
thing like United Way runs itself, and
it will run itself whether I'm in it or
not. The Boy Scouts will keep going
with or without my help. But the
track in Stadium Park, and the Ribs
Burn-Off, and the Palace Theater, and
the merger of the Children's Museum
with the Historical Society—there I
think I've had an instrumental role."
-K.E.T.
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The Class of 1989
The Class of 1989 is smaller—by
design—than its predecessor: 225
students entered the school last fall.
About 40 percent are from outside
Ohio; and they come from 22 differ
ent states, including Hawaii, and also
from Puerto Rico, the United King
dom, and Yugoslavia.
Half the class came straight to law
school from college. For the other
half, the gap between college and law
school ranges from 1 to 40 years. The
average age is 24.1 (24.7 for the
women, 23.75 for the men).
The percentage of women is the
highest ever at this law school—45
percent. And the percentage of
minority students (10 percent) con
tinues the trend of the past few
years. Three years ago there were
only 30 minority students in the
school, and today there are 64.
This year's entrants have degrees
from 121 different undergraduate
institutions, and 18 members of the
class have advanced degrees. These
include Ph.D.'s in economics and
theology, an M.D., a D.P.M. (doctor of
podiatric medicine), and master's
degrees in accounting, architecture,
English, business administration,
public administration, forensic sci
ence, and urban and environmental
studies.
Certainly the best news about the
Class of 1989 is that, in spite of the
nation's shrinking pool of law school
applicants, this class has better objec
tive credentials (in terms of grade
point average and LSAT score) than
last year's class. As the good word
gets out about the law school, the
quality of the student body continues
to increase.

Joan Arrington, a graduate of Hiram College,
spent the summer as a CLEO Fellow
(Council on Legal Education Opportunity).
One of the instructors in the program was
Tammy Lenzy, '88, and that connection
helped to bring Arrington to the Law School
Arrington has a special interest in civil rights
law and says she hopes, after law school,
to work "for those most in need of good legal
representation, perhaps through the
Legal Aid Society,"

John Canala graduated from West Virginia
University in 1976 and from the Ohio
College of Podiatric Medicine in 1982;
to our knowledge, he is the first podiatrist
ever to come through the Law School.
Canala continues his podiatry practice and—
not surprisingly—says he's particularly
interested in "law-medicine relationships
of any and all types."

Linda Davido, whose husband Scott is a
third-year student, took a bachelor's degree
from Ashland College in 1982 and then went
to work for the Standard Oil Company first
as a marine accountant, then as a systems
analyst, then as an associate contract
administrator. Courses at CWRU's
Weatherhead School of Management have
deepened her interest in computers and
management information systems. She says
now, "My dream would be to litigate hightech computer law issues."

Nancy Fleming finished college (Ohio State
University) twenty years ago and made a
career teacjiing mathematics, along the way
picking up a master's degree at Miami
University, completing most of a Ph.D. at
Bowling Green State University, and raising
four children. (She recently acquired four
more via a second marriage.) She attributes
her change of direction in part to an
automobile accident three years ago that
nearly cost her a leg and, she says, caused
her to think hard about what she wanted to
do with the rest of her life.

Terry Goldberg, like Nancy Fleming, has
raised four children and is embarking on a
second career. She began by completing a
B.A. degree at Ursuline College (she had
earlier attended Ohio State University); last
May she and her son and two daughters were
holding a joint graduation celebration. Susan
Frankel, director of admission, reports that
one of the most persuasive letters of
recommendation that she has received in
recent years was one from Goldberg's son
Daniel, now a resident in general surgery at
the New England Medical Center. Terry
Goldberg is the daughter of a CWR U law
graduate: Philip Synenberg, '28.

Lee Stockdale grew up in Florida, spent two
years at Antioch College in the troubled early
70s, worked for two years, and then finished
a degree at the University of Washington.
Fie joined the Army as a military policeman
and rose through the ranks to become a
commissioned officer; he left as a captain.
He just returned to this country from an
overseas tour of duty in Berlin. After living
in all corners of the country he explains
the special attraction ofCWRU: his wife
is a Clevelander.

Jim Lang went from high school to the Navy,
and after two years the Navy sent him to
college. He received his B.S. in engineering in
1982 from the University of Southern
California, and since then he has been flying
P-3 aircraft. "Each year," he explains, "the
Navy offers five officers the opportunity to
laterally transfer from the fleet to the JAG
Corps. At my request the JAG Corps sent me
to Case for my J.D. degree." Lang will spend
his summers in a legal service office on an
East coast naval base, and he hopes that the
Navy will send him back to Hawaii after he
graduates.

A native of Puerto Rico, Dinorah Manon
graduated in 1980 from the university there,
with a degree in chemistry. Since then she
has worked for Roche Products as a
laboratory analyst and for the Bristol Myers
Corporation as coordinator of regulatory and
compliance affairs. She moved to Cleveland a
year ago, when her husband accepted a
teaching position in the university's School
of Medicine, and she began coursework
in the spring at the Weatherhead School of
Management. She is enrolled in
the J.D./M.B.A. program.

Jeff Wolf (left) and Spike jDavid B.) Webster both have show business in their backgrounds.
Wolf whose hometown is Hudson, Ohio, went to Colorado College for a B.A. degree because,
he explains, "I was a figure skater and had the opportunity to train with many of the top
national competitors in Colorado Springs." He liked what he found there, and now he hopes
eventually to go back to the West to practice law. Meanwhile, he's earning some of his tuition
money by coaching skating as an assistant to Olympic champion Carol Heiss Jenkins. Webster
has a bachelor of fine arts degree in theater from Ohio University, and he has worked with the
Milwaukee Repertory Company and the Monomay Theater on Cape Cod. He says that his
immediate ambition is "to survive law school with my creative instincts intact," and that
ultimately he hopes to be a litigator. He is the second David Webster to enter the Law School as
a Merit Scholar: David J. is a second-year student.
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Moot Court Trounces Law Review
What would In Brief be without a
sports page?
The great athletic event of the Law
School's fall semester was a hardfought football game between the
Moot Court Board and the editorial
board of the Law Review. The Student
Bar Association sponsored the match,
which means that they paid for the
beer and pizza consumed on the
sidelines.
They also recruited as referees
Dean Peter Gerhart and Assistant
Dean Maurice Schoby and elegantly
attired them in regulation black and
white stripes, complete with names
on the back. In Brief is happy to
report that Gerhart and Schoby per
formed tirelessly, justly, and alto
gether professionally. Should they tire
of the academic life, they can apply
to the NFL for employment.
This was the second annual
encounter between Moot Court and
Law Review. It seems to have
replaced an older tradition, lapsed in
recent years, which had the Law
Review playing the faculty. At least
one faculty member thinks that's just
as well: "It probably saves us old
guys from a lot of injuries."*
Sports fans are reminded that win
ter brings that annual classic, the
Phlegm Snopes Basketball Tourna
ment, with its culmination at the
Richfield Coliseum. February 12 is
the date this year, and all are invited.
-K.E.T.

Referee Gerhart, whistle at the ready.

•After In Brief went to press, the Law
Review—no doubt piqued by their
trouncing and looking for an easily
defeatable opponent—challenged the
faculty. The Law Review won. No old
guys were injured.
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The editor in chief of the Law Review, Dean
Gamin, donned appropriate headgear but did
not succeed in inspiring his troops to victory.

Sally Ackerman, chairman of the Moot Court
Board, was overjoyed to accept
the Dean's Cup.

The Canada-U.S. Exchange Program
A Student's Perspective
by Michael Moran, '87

In the fall of 1984, arriving at
CWRU as a first-year law student, I
happened to pick up a copy of In
Brief (June 1984| that had an excel
lent article tracing the history of the
Canada-United States Law Institute
and its student exchange program.
The idea of spending a semester of
law school in the Great White North
immediately attracted me. At the
time I was not even interested in
international law per se. But my par
ents had always encouraged me to
travel outside the country (I'm a firstgeneration American from Ireland),
and I felt that a Canadian experience
could only broaden my perspective.
Furthermore, the article struck a
nerve when it noted that Canada is
our number-one trade partner,
number-one investment partner, and
number-one military-strategic partner,
and yet Americans are generally
ignorant about Canada. I realized that
I knew next to nothing about Canada:
their politics, their system of govern
ment, their legal system. In fact, I
could not even name the Canadian
prime minister!
Today, with the advantage of hind
sight, I firmly believe that Americans
are often better informed about
sparsely populated countries halfway
around the world than they are about
our thirty million neighbors to the
north. How many readers know who
the leader of Libya is? Now, how
many know who the leader of Can
ada is? I rest my case.
Undoubtedly, the general lack of
interest that Americans display
toward Canada can be attributed to
the fact that the two countries enjoy
such a peaceful relationship. The
border between them is the longest
peaceful border in the world. But one
wonders whether that justifies such
ignorance.
At any rate, three of us were cho
sen from my class—the others were
Spencer Rand and Lisa Slage—to
attend the University of Western
Ontario's law school in the spring
semester of 1986.
At the outset, it might be noted that
Canada has ten provinces, two terri
tories (whose climate keeps them
sparsely populated), and sixteen law
schools, including one in Quebec
where instruction is entirely in
French. The capital of Canada,
Ottawa, and a large percentage of the
Canadian population are in the prov
ince of Ontario.
Canadian law students do not get
experience in summer clerkships as

Mick Moran came lo the Law School from Kent State University, where he majored in
economics and won an award as outstanding student senator. The photo was taken last spring
in London, Ontario. Moran says that his Canadian experience only whetted his appetite for
international adventures in the law: he has dreams of returning one day to Ireland, his ancestral
home, to practice as a barrister.

American students do. Rather, upon
graduation, they participate in a
twelve-month "articling" program,
which is essentially a year's appren
ticeship with a law firm. After that
they prepare for the bar exam. This
mandatory apprenticeship struck me
as an idea worth adopting. Even in
this country not all law students get
clerking experience, and many new
lawyers are simply thrown into prac
tice.
In many respects Canada is quite
similar to the United States, but I
immediately noticed two striking
differences. First was how clean and
litter-free Canada is. I still have no
explanation for that—unless it is the
fact that beer is considerably more
expensive there! Second, Canada is
safer than the United States. You can
walk anywhere in any major city
with no fear for your life; no areas
are out of bounds. The most obvious
explanation for this difference is that
handguns are prohibited in Canada
and rifles are subject to strict regula
tion. In contrast to the United States,
Canada has very few homicides com
mitted with handguns.
I decided that I would concentrate
my studies on the comparative
aspects of Canadian and U.S. tax law.

I took courses in Canadian income
tax, taxation of shareholders and
corporations, company law (a course
comparable to this school's Business
Associations II), and—at Western's
business school—a course in invest
ment management. One of my prede
cessors, John Krajewski, '85 (now a
member of the Canada-U.S. Law
Institute's advisory board) had told
me that Western had a really highcaliber tax department, and I found
that it lived up to his billing.
In essence, the Canadian system of
taxation for individuals is quite simi
lar to ours, but Canadian corporate
taxation has many features not
present in our system. For example,
there are lower rates and many other
tax breaks available for Canadianowned private corporations. There
are many protective devices built into
the tax code to reward investment of
capital in Canada and to discourage
investment abroad.
Interestingly, the overall Canadian
tax rates on investments and corpora
tions are remarkably similar to those
in the United States. Obviously, this
is due in part to the relative ease
with which investments and corpora
tions could be relocated across a
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border to a more favorable tax cli
mate. It will be interesting to observe
what happens once this country's
new tax scheme is fully imple
mented. Incidentally, I found it
refreshing to note that Canadian tax
lawyers are just as ingenious as
American lawyers are at exploiting
loopholes in their tax code.
The course called Company Law
was strikingly similar to CWRU's
B.A. II, mostly because Canada's
recently enacted Business Corpora
tions Act is modeled after the New
York Business Corporations Act. The
similarity between the two acts is
necessary because, as noted earlier,
there is so much commercial activity
across the border.
My favorite class was Investment
Management in Western's M.B.A.
program. We studied pension plan
ning, estate planning, stock market
and bond market strategies, and a
variety of investment vehicles avail
able in both Canada and the United
States. When I returned to the states,
I interviewed with an attorney spe
cializing in pension planning and I
secured a summer job. As far as I
know, I'm the first American student
to find the exchange program so
directly helpful in a job search.
In my Canadian classes the
intensely competitive, even cut-throat
atmosphere of many American law
schools was notably absent. And the
teaching method was not Socratic; in

Canadian law schools that ends with
the first year.
The first time I spoke in class, I
could not understand why everyone
turned to stare at me. A friend later
told me that my American accent
ricochets off the walls. It was strange
to think of myself as a foreigner.
When I heard other students talking
about events "south of the border," I
thought at first that they were talking
about Mexico. Then it hit me that it
was my country they were talking
about!
Like my American predecessors,
and like the Canadian students who
have spent a semester at Case West
ern Reserve, I found myself repeat
edly raising my hand and saying:
"But where I come from we don't do
it that way." For example, I found
myself explaining that in the U.S.
married couples usually benefit from
filing a joint income tax return. In
Canada there is no provision in the
tax code for joint filing; everyone
files individually. These differences in
perspective were beneficial, I think,
both to me and to my classmates: we
were prompted to discuss and ana
lyze the merits of each system.
Both Canada and the United States
share the tradition of common law,
and Canadian law students read
many English common law cases. But
Canada is also a member of the Com
monwealth. Consequently, you read
cases decided by courts in New

Zealand, Australia, and Scotland that
are valid precedent in Canada,
It interested me to learn that the
Canadian bar prohibits contingency
representation, presumably because
they feel that contingency fees would
lead to numbers of unwarranted
lawsuits. I would often argue the
other side: that there are probably
many injured persons who cannot
afford to bring suit. The typical Cana
dian response to that was that Ameri
can attorneys are overly anxious to
sue. Query: what would happen to
many personal injury attorneys in
America if we suddenly prohibited
contingency fees?
Again and again, at social func
tions, Canadians would ask me,
"How do you like Canada?" I learned
that the easiest way to start a lively
political discussion was to reply, "I
love it, and—by the way—when are
you going to join the U.S. as the fiftyfirst state?" I am happy to report that
Canadian nationalism is as strong as
ever.
More seriously, I did like Canada,
and I'm glad that I took advantage of
the exchange program. I'd recom
mend it to any other law student as
an excellent opportunity to immerse
oneself in another legal system and
appreciate the differences between it
and our own. There's only one bad
thing about a Canadian semesterhaving to leave at the end of it!

BLSA Activitie s
The Case Western Reserve chapter
of the Black Law Student Association
is having a busy and productive year.
Its executive board consists of Hewitt
Smith, president; Sylvester Summers,
vice president: Alison Nelson, secre
tary; and Joseph Williams, treasurer.
Tammy Lenzy a second-year student,
holds a regional office: she is the
Midwest BLSA recording secretary.
BLSA has lent considerable support
to the efforts of the school's admis
sions office to increase the numbers
of minority applicants and, ulti
mately, the number of minority
matriculants. In recent years those
efforts have borne fruit. Thanks in no
small part to B-LSA, the_ 1986-87 stu
dent body includes about 60 black
students—almost certainly the largest
number in the school's history. BLSA
began the year by welcoming the
new black students with a picnic at
the North Chagrin Reservation during
the school's orientation days.
Just after the fall term began, on
September 6, BLSA invited black
attorneys in the area—both alumni
and non-alumni—to a reception at the
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Law School to meet the new dean. It
was an occasion, too, for them to
meet students and faculty.
In November BLSA sponsored its
fourth annual pre-law seminar for
undergraduate minority students
interested in applying to law school.
BLSA members and area practitioners
discussed application procedures and
all aspects of the law school experi
ence, and faculty members presented
a mock first-year class. About thirty
high school and undergraduate stu
dents came from all over Ohio and
from nearby states.
^
BLSA is working in other ways to
establish a relationship with area
youth. As In Brief went to press,
there were plans for classes and sem
inars that would focus primarily on
improving analytical skills and writ
ing skills.
February is Black History Month,
and the BLSA chapter plans a series
of speakers at the school. The focus,
says BLSA president Hewitt Smith,
will be on the role of the lawyer in
the community. Black jurists and
practitioners, elected officials, and

persons in government agencies will
be invited to participate.
In the spring CWRU's BLSA chap
ter will join with the BLSA chapter at
Cleveland State University's Cleveland-Marshall College of Law in
sponsoring the annual scholarship
banquet. April 11 is the tentative
date. CWRU's black graduates can
expect an appeal for their financial
support, but in the meantime BLSA
will welcome their assistance and
support in less tangible but no less
meaningful form. Smith and his
BLSA colleagues hope to be in regu
lar communication with them.

Forsan et haec olim meminisse
juvabit...
by Dennis I. Harrison
University Archivist

For attorneys, schooled in the
written word and cognizant of the
authority inherent in even the sim
plest legal document, it is hardly
necessary to explain the significance
of the Law School records stored in
the Case Western Reserve University
archives. The legal value of a corpo
rate charter, a constitution or a set of
by-laws, or a list of students meeting
the requirements for graduation is
immediately apparent.
Equally obvious is the value of
the collection to administrators of the
university. Such records as a series of
accreditation reports or the dean's
annual reports provide a historical
perspective essential to current deci
sion making.
There is another dimension to the
archives: the collection brings to life
the personalities and events of days
gone by. As Virgil put it, in the words
I have borrowed as a title: "Perhaps
the remembrance of these things will
prove a source of pleasure."
Some of the items among the
Law School records have proved to
be just that. For example, among the
very oldest records in the archives
are small notes written in 1836, in
ink now faded to a reddish brown,
attesting that Franklin Thomas
Backus "has just completed a course
of education at Yale University" and
has placed "among the most distin
guished of his class in literary and
scientific attainments."
Among the records actually cre
ated by this law school are the min
utes and records of attendance at
faculty meetings, both of which begin
in 1892, as well as catalogs of the
school from 1893 on, and copies of
the Law Journal from 1895. Among
the earliest photographs are portraits
of the Class of 1899 and a photo
graph of the Class of 1904.
The collection includes records of
many former faculty who are still
well remembered by their students.
Professor Clarence M. Finfrock's
well-known love of birds is apparent
in a thin volume labeled simply "Bird
Diary," in which he recorded hun
dreds of bird sightings from 1921
through 1931.
A gradebook of Professor Archi
bald P. Throckmorton, kept as care
fully as the bird counts of Professor
Finfrock, records the marks of his
students in Torts and in Constitu
tional Law from 1923 to 1938, the
year of his death. In still another
portion of the collection a letter from

University archivist Dennis Harrison with the file of Dean Finfrock's wartime correspondence.
Harrison took charge of the CWRU archives in 1985. He had been, for many years, curator of
manuscripts for the Western Reserve Historical Society. A graduate of Heidelberg College, he
holds M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from Case Western Reserve. Among other professional activities,
he is a past president of the Society of Ohio Archivists and the current chairman of the
society's Legislative Committee.

Dean Walter T. Dunmore catches the
eye. Written in 1942, three years
before his death, it expresses the
desire that the settlement he envi
sioned after World War II would "at
least give us a reasonably long
peace." This letter, to a much youn
ger man, closes with the opinion that
"after all, the hope of the world lies
with the young."
One of the earliest records of
student activities at the school is a
file on the Rufus P. Ranney Club,
including a petition of the club for
incorporation as the Ranney Chapter
of the Phi Delta Phi legal fraternity
and a short history detailing the
efforts of club members to secure a
charter. (The history was written by
Frank M. Cobb, '99, who later joined
the faculty. Among the club members
responsible for securing the charter
were William R. Hopkins, '99, later
city manager of Cleveland, and Carl
D. Friebolin, '99, who also served on
the law faculty and whose satirical
wit was well known through the City
Club's annual production, the Anvil
Review.)
The students encountered numer
ous difficulties in securing a charter
despite endorsements from existing
chapters and from alumni, including
a statement from the Swan Chapter
at Ohio State University attesting to a
personal acquaintance with members
of the Ranney Club and assuring the
national secretary that "the best

material of the college is collected in
this club." The petition was rejected
in 1899 by three negative votes of the
existing chapters and, after this hur
dle had been overcome, was then
rejected by a vote of the fraternity's
national council in March 1901. At
this point two prominent Cleveland
ers, Judge Frederick A. Henry and
Frank B. Williams Choate, personally
intervened with the national council
and secured a reversal of the deci
sion.
Other student records include the
book of minutes of the Garfield
Debating Club, formed in 1909 to
debate issues of interest to law stu
dents. Over the years a number of
secretaries put their hand to the
book, including Garvin Amster, '12;
Maurice L. Gelfand, '13; and George
R. Platt, '14. In later years there are
records pertaining to the moot court,
and a short skit survives from the
1930s satirizing the faculty in verse.
A more serious note is struck in a
letter written November 12, 1917, by
Benjamin F. Roth, then a third-year
student, to the president of the senior
class at the University of Cincinnati
Law School, following the entry of
the United States into World War I.
Roth noted that "a large percentage
of the present Senior Class is desirous
of immediately entering military
service" and requested that the stu
dents at Cincinnati join with their
faculty, in cooperation with other
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Ohio law schools, to pressure the
state Supreme Court to schedule
early bar exams in December for
students desiring to enlist. Within a
year, the rush to colors was such that
all of the day law schools in Ohio
except Western Reserve were closed,
and enrollment here had dropped
from 115 in 1917 to 46 in 1918
despite the school's admission of the
first women in its history.
Twenty-five years later Professor
Finfrock, who had corresponded with
his former students in service during
the first war, once more found the
law building nearly empty as the
students again joined the armed
forces. The correspondence of this
period is a moving testimonial to
Finfrock's devotion to the school and
its students.
The letters date from 1942
through 1946 and originate in
Europe, Asia, Africa, and North
America. One of the earliest is from
Sergeant Robert E. Jaffe, '41, inform
ing Finfrock that on the day the bar
results were announced he was being
inducted into the U.S. Army. He
passed the bar and was sworn in
while training at Fort Hayes. In 1943
Norman Sugarman, '40, was standing
guard, digging foxholes, cleaning
barracks, and oiling rifles. He also

won medals as a marksman. Michael
Presti, who was stationed in Egypt
near the Suez Canal, was actually
practicing law; he had appeared in
court to defend a soldier charged
with assault "to wit with a 30 cal.
rifle." His client was acquitted. In
1945 William J. Kraus, '34, wrote
that he had landed at Normandy and
was now in Paris. Ivan L. Miller, '38,
who had received a bronze star at
Normandy, was temporarily housed
in a private home in Belgium.
■IWo years later, in 1947, the
students were home again, and law
school enrollment shot from 48 in
1943-44 to almost 500 in 1947-48.
These students are still remembered
for the unusual maturity and serious
ness that they brought to the
classroom.
Twenty years later a younger
generation of students took part in
the domestic struggles for civil rights
that characterized the 1960s. A report
by David N. Strand, '68, outlines the
activities and goals of the Law Stu
dents Civil Rights Research Council
of Case Western Reserve University,
which grew out of a student legal aid
committee founded in early 1966 by
Stephen M. Pfarrer and James L.
Rigelhaupt, Jr., both '67. By 1968 the
chapter was working closely with the

Cleveland Legal Aid Society, with
Louis Stokes and Russell Adrine of
the NAACP, and with officials of
several community organizations. A
major goal of the council was to
secure a greater degree of latitude for
law school students in supervised
clinics to appear on behalf of indigent
clients.
The work of preserving the Law
School records continues in the Uni
versity Archives on a daily basis.
Existing records must be properly
kept, and more recent records must
be identified, transferred to the
archives, and catalogued for retrieval.
Administrators, faculty, and students
frequently request information from
the records.
The University Archives wel
comes donations of documents rele
vant to student life. In fact, such
material is likely to survive only if it
finds its way to an archive. The
materials used in preparation of this
article were available because they
had been placed in the University
Archives. Letters, photographs, and
other materials given the Archives
today will be here to give informa
tion—and pleasure—to the genera
tions of tomorrow.

1986 Law Alumni Weekend
By all accounts the 1986 Alumni
Weekend was a smashing success.
Some 500 alumni participated in one
or more of the weekend's events, and
spouses and friends nearly doubled
the crowd. The planners in the
school's Office of External Affairs
were particularly pleased by the
number of graduates—about 80—who
journeyed in from some distance. For
many of these, it was the first visit to
the Law School's present quarters in
Gund Hall.
By now the Alumni Weekend is
well established as an annual event,
and plans are already under way for
the festivities of 1987. The date is set:
it's the weekend of Saturday, Septem
ber 19. Ten classes will gather for
special reunion parties that evening:
1937, 1942, 1947, 1952, . . . 1977,
1982. If you're in one of those classes
ending in -7 or-2 and you'd like to
help in the planning, please call Kerstin Trawick, director of external
affairs, at 216/368-3860.

Meanwhile, here's a report on the
1986 reunions. Many, many thanks to
the reunion planning committees,
and special thanks to those graduates
(and their spouses!) who hosted the
events. The Law School's faculty and
staff party-hoppers unanimously
report: every single one was a
GREAT party.

James R. Strawn is the 1986 Distinguished Recent Graduate (see profile, page 22}.
Ann Womer Benjamin, '78, presented the award.

I

On behalf of the Tau Epsilon Rho legal fraternity, David Sindell, '36 (right) presented the
Fletcher Reed Andrews Graduate of the Year Award to Ivan L. Miller, '38.

Michael Button, '26, came from Columbus to
celebrate the sixtieth anniversary of his
graduation. He's with his son, Eugene.

The Judicial Outfitters sold truckloads of T-shirts during the Alumni Weekend. Allan Kleinman,
'52, and Allen Bickart, '56, are the models in this photo, while Winther McCroom, '61 (behind
Kleinman's shoulder) and Carolyn Bickart look on admiringly.
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Classmates ('331 Clark Morrow
and Walter Whitlatch.
Ruth 1'45) and Austin Klein and Emmet Pedley, both '34.

Winther j'611 and Shirley McCroom.

Class of 1936
Nearly half (45 percent) of the 50year class joined in the golden anni
versary celebration at the Playhouse
Club. Dave Sindell was the master of
ceremonies; other committee mem
bers were Howard Bernstein, Bert
Colclaser, John Jaeger, Larry Knecht,
and Bing Zellmer. Travelers included
Charles Chaney from Columbus, Ted
Kremer from Senecaville, Norman
Miller from Florida, Bill Stickle from
New Hampshire, Norman Faulk from
Pennsylvania, Norman McDonough
from Missouri, Charlie Vanik from
Washington, D.C., and Jim Reigert all
the way from Washington state.
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Standing: John Jaeger, Howard Bernstein, Arthur Mentall, Joseph Robbins, David Sindell,
Maurice (Jimj Reigert, Norman Faulk, Charles Vanik, Theodore Kremer, Norman McDonough,
Charles Chaney. Seated: Alberta Colclaser, Janette Pierce Vogelgesang, Otto Schutz, Norman
Miller, William Stickle, Warren Smith.

Janette Pierce Vogelgesang
and Alberta Colclaser

Class of 1941
When Ray Robertson's illness (from
which he is now fully recovered)
forced a last-minute change of loca
tion, Tony and Ruth Klie invited the
class to their home instead. Eleven
class members (out of thirty on the
mailing list) were there, coming from
New Jersey (Manning Case), Canton
(Bob Eshelman), Akron (Bob Petersilge), Carl Engel (Columbus), and
Joe Quatman (Lima). Case, Robert
son, Eshelman, and Petersilge were
on the planning committee, along
with Jim Carney, Ed Warren, and
Bob Horrigan.

Dora and Edward Warren, Sally Fridrich and James Carney.
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Class of 1946
Stan and Hope Adelstein invited
Stan's classmates to be their guests at
the Cleveland Racquet Club, and
exactly half the class members were
able to accept their invitation.
Attendees included George and Jean
Sauter (from Mansfield) and other
members of the planning committee:
Rita Newton, George Kasik, Jay
White, and Francis Talty.

Francis Tally, George and Jean Sauter.
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Class of 1951
The Class of 1951 has scattered
widely, but 23 of them came back
(including Bill Strachan from Texas,
Lloyd Doran from Illinois, and Ken
Thornton and Don Zimmerman from
elsewhere in Ohio] for the 35-year
reunion. That was the biggest
reunion group the class has ever

mustered, and it meant a move from
Anne and Charles Landefeld's home
to the Faculty Dining Room on the
CWRU campus. Professor Morris
Shanker and former Professor Robert
Bensing joined in the revelry and
were accepted into the group photo
graph as honorary members of the
class.

A sizeable committee lent their
backing: Charlie Ault, Jack Gherlein,
Ed Gold, A1 Gray, Charlie Griesinger,
Bill Haase, Ted Jones, Anne Landefeld, Joe Spaniol, Bill Stein, Jack
Stickney Pat Thomas, Ken Thornton,
George Umstead, Fred Weisman, and
Jim Wilkinson.

Front row: Rudolph Zadnik, Wallace Krivoy, Edward Gold, William Strachan, Lloyd Doran. Behind them: Robert Bensing (formerly on the
faculty), John Butala, Jr, Alvin Gray, Donald Zimmerman, Charles Griesinger. Standing: Kenneth Thornton, John Sullivan, Mario Corsi,
James Wilkinson, Professor Morris Shanker, Fred Weisman, John Stickney, Allard Rosen, Charles Ault, Robert Grogan, Neil Conway.
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Class of 1956
Bill and Janet Smith hosted the
class at their home and arranged a
grand clambake. Others in on the
planning were Marty Blake, Jack
Cronquist, Jerry Ellerin, Larry Gor
don, Ron Rice, Dan Roth (who came
from Youngstown), Keith Spero, Tony
Viola, and Bob Weber. A1 Gandal
came in from Washington, D.C.,
Sherm Titens from Kansas City, and
A1 Bickart from Arizona. In all,
nearly a third of the class came
together for the occasion.
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Class of 1961
The silver anniversary class gath
ered at the home of Bob and Donna
Jackson, coming from Canton (John
Werren), Cincinnati (Tim Garry],
Wisconsin (Mike Joseph), Illinois
(Harvey Adelstein), and even Califor
nia (Alan Arnold and Ken Brown).
The 23 class members attending
represented nearly half the total.

John Werren, Thomas Mason, Myron Joseph, Kenneth Brown.

Harvey and Doris Adelstein

Erwin Apell and host Robert Jackson

Class of 1966
Paul Brickner, Tom LaFond, Dale
LaPorte, John Lindamood, Jim Streicher, and Leon Weiss put together the
twenty-year celebration at the Cleve
land Skating Club. Close to a third of
the class was there, including J. C.
Argetsinger from Washington, D.C.,
and Californian Mike DiSanto.

Admiring 20-year-old photographs: Thomas LaFond, Thomas and Elsa Pavlik,
and Michael Di Santo.

Leon Weiss

Dale LaPorte and Kenneth Boukis (with Richard Binzley and Phillip Campanella
in the background!.
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Class of 1971
Cray and Peggy Coppins had nearly
a third of the class at their home, and
the group included an amazing array
of travelers: Tom Africa and Norman
Levine from Pennsylvania, Jerry
Boykin from Virginia, Doug Carr
from Maine, A. J. DiMattia from
New Jersey, Karen Hammerstrom
from D.C., Charlie Peck from Massa
chusetts, Herb Phipps from Georgia,
Jerry Scanlan from Nevada, Ruth
Zack Sorenson from California, and
former faculty member Ovid Lewis
from Florida.
Committee members were Coppins,
Peck, Phipps, John Demer, Jerry
Jackson, Willie Kohn, Joyce Neiditz,
Tim Reed, Maynard Thomson, Greg
Weiss, and John Wilbur.

Karen Hammerstrom and Carl Utrata

Ovid Lewis (formerly on the faculty},
A. J. Di Mattia, and John Demer.

Charles Peck and Herbert Phipps,
with Dean Gerhart.

Cray Coppins and Douglas Carr, with Professor Lewis Katz.

Class of 1976
Exactly a fourth of the class came
together at the home of Pat and
Franklin Plotkin. Those included
John Campion from North Carolina,
Roland Eckert from Chicago, Buzz
Guida and Karen Savransky from
Massachusetts, Barney Katchen and
Vicki Morrison from New Jersey,
Joan Moore from Michigan, Dixon
Miller from Columbus, Bob Sassone
from New York, and four from Wash
ington, D.C.: Joe Baldinger, Sander
Bieber, Steve Glazer, and Barbara
Gordon.
A big committee helped in the
planning: Plotkin, Katchen, Miller,
Morrison, Savransky, Lee Fisher,
Mark Hoffman, Peggy Kennedy, Joan
Mandel Gross, Bruce Mandel, Rob
McCreary, Barbara Saltzman, Gilda
Spears, Roger Shumaker.

Robert Sassone and Gilda Spears
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Steven Glazer and William Jacobs flank Mr. and Mrs. T (Irene and Perry Tenenbaumj.

David Rowthorn and
Patrick McLaughlin

Patricia Plotkin and party-hopper
Owen Heggs, '67, formerly on the
taw faculty.

Class of 1981
Jean and Walter Kalberer welcomed
members of Jean's class (29 per
cent of the total) to their home, plus
spouses and others. Along with Jean
Kalberer, the committee included
Virginia Brown, Laura Chisolm, Col
leen Conway Cooney, Stuart Cordell
(who came from Ashtabula), Susan
Frankel, Karen Greve, Bob Griffo
and Dawn Starr and Paul Gutermann
(who all came from Washington),
Susan Metzenbaum Hyatt (who came
from Kansas City), Peter Koenig
(from Cincinnati), Neil Kozokoff,
David Posteraro, and Ted Prasse.
Other travelers were Leo Daly
(Minnesota), Tim Danello and Lorie
Nierenberg (D.C.), Lee Gottesman
(New Jersey), Stephanie Pardo and
Jeff Kaufman (New York), Mark Kim
ball (Texas), Tom Lodge (Cincinnati),
Amelia Nichols Lombardo (Mary
land), Linda Rhone (Pittsburgh), Les
ter Rosensaft (Massachusetts), John
Stillpass (Cincinnati), and Dan Trim
ble (Virginia).
68

Stuart Van Wagenen

Lester Rosensaft, Steven Miller,
and Steven Shagrin

Thomas Horton, Timothy Danello, and
James Phillips.

Matthew Moriarty and Jean Kalberer

Clinic Reunion
In celebration of the Law School
Clinic's tenth anniversary, all the
participants in its history were
invited to get together at the home of
Patricia Yeomans, '84. Several former
faculty came back for the occasion:
Owen Heggs, '67, Lee Hutton, Robert
Kirk (now in Washington, D.C.),
Robert Stotter, Mary Jo Long (now in
Albany, New York). The range of
former clinicians went from a '76
graduate, David Rowthorn, through
Dennis Harrington, '86. It is reported
that the Mexican dinner was terrific
and the margaritas flowed freely.

Julia Gleisser, Neal Wainblat, '80, and
Jerome i/Vebhs, also '80, with
Dean Gerhart.

Classmates ('SO) Waldemar Wojcik
and Mary Jane Trapp.

Ruth Harris, the Clinic's longtime secretary,
and her husband Edward.

Kathryn Mercer and Ruth Spencer, both '83.
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New Alumni Officers
The 1986 Alumni Weekend
included the Annual Meeting of the
Law Alumni Association and the
election of new leadership for the
1986-87 academic year.
Thomas A. Heffernan, '64, suc
ceeded William W. Allport, '69, as
president of the association. A part
ner in the Cleveland firm of Spangenberg, Shibley, Traci & Lancione, Hef
fernan has been a trustee of the
Cleveland Bar Association, president
and trustee of the Ohio Academy of
Trial Lawyers, and a member of the
Board of Governors of the Associa
tion of Trial Lawyers of America.
Last year he was elected a member
of the Law School's Society of Ben
chers.
The new vice president, replacing
Susan G, Braden, '73, is Patrick M.
Zohn, '78. Heffernan and Zohn are a
continuing partnership; last year
Heffernan chaired the Alumni
Annual Fund, and Zohn chaired one
of its major components—the Tele
thon. Zohn holds the all-time record
for zealous telephoning: in eight

years of Law School Telethons, at the
rate of four or five nights per year, he
attended every evening but one. Like
Heffernan, Zohn is a trial attorney, in
the Cleveland office of the United
States Department of Labor.
The association's secretary and
treasurer were re-elected. John S.
Pyle, '74, the continuing secretary, is
with Gold, Rotator!, Schwartz &
Gibbons, a Cleveland criminal
defense firm, and Ivan L. Otto, '62,
treasurer, is with Squire, Sanders &
Dempsey.
Five members of the Board of Gov
ernors retired as their three-year
terms ended: Ann Womer Benjamin
and Colleen Conway Cooney, both
'81; M. Patricia Donnelly, '80; Daniel
L. Ekelman, '52; and George J. Moscarino, '58. Five new members were
elected to replace them:
Richard H. Bamberger, '72, clerked
for U.S. District Court Judge William
K. Thomas for two years before join
ing Baker & Hostetler. His principal
area of practice is pensions and
employee benefit plans; he teaches a

seminar at the Law School as a mem
ber of the adjunct faculty.
J. Michael Drain, '70, began his
career at Ernst & Whinney, spent a
year with Ulmer, Berne, Laronge,
Glickman & Curtis, and now is a
partner in Fillo, Ristau & Drain, an
insurance defense firm, and also
assistant law director of the City of
Solon.
Patricia Marcus Holland, '77, spent
several years in Chicago with Schiff
Hardin & Waite. Now she is a part
ner in Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan
& Aronoff, concentrating in corporate
and securities law.
James W. McKee, '69, is a patent
attorney. He started out with Meyer,
Tilberry & Body, and since 1972 he
has been with the firm now known
as Fay, Sharpe, Fagan, Minnich &
McKee.
Jerry F. Whitmer, '60, the one nonClevelander among the five, is with
Brouse & McDowell in Akron. He
joined that firm in 1968 after eight
years' practice with Johnson, Whit
mer & Sayre.

Patrick M. Zohn, '78, is the new vice
president. He was presented with a
personalized Official CWRU Law Suit T-shirt
in recognition of his outstanding performance
as telethon chairman.

The Alumni Association's new president,
Thomas A. Heffernan, '64.

J. Michael Drain, '70, new on the
Board of Governors.

Jerry Whitmer, '60, new member of the
Board of Governors.

Classmates ('691 James W. McKee, a new governor of the Alumni Association,
and William W. Allport, who concluded a year as president.
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New Development Director

Effective January 1, 1987, the Law
School has a new director of develop
ment, Kevin L. Gladstone.
Gladstone grew up in Cleveland,
attended St. Ignatius High School,
and went from there to Xavier Uni

versity in Cincinnati, where he
received a B.A. in political science in
1974. He stayed in Cincinnati for
four years, working for the Early &
Daniel Company as a grain merchan
diser, and then returned to St. Igna
tius High School as director of alumni
relations and annual support.
After four years with St. Ignatius,
he moved on to Trinity High School,
where he established that school's
first development office.
In 1984 Gladstone was appointed
Cleveland State University's assistant
director of development for annual
support and alumni programs. Last
summer he was promoted to director.
Gladstone says that what mainly
attracted him to the Law School was
its reputation and that of the univer
sity as a whole. The institution is

"about the best there is,” as he puts
it, and he looks forward to being a
part of it.
He sees his first task as, simply, to
get acquainted: to meet alumni and
friends and understand their percep
tions of the Law School. Then, not
far down the road, some thought will
have to be given to a capital cam
paign: Should we? Or shouldn't we?
Gladstone assures In Brief that the
prospect of working with a bunch of
lawyers holds no terrors for him. His
brother, Stephen, is a 1981 CWRU
graduate, now with Thompson, Hine
& Flory. And he reminds us that St.
Ignatius has a particularly strong and
active group of law alumni: he's
expecting to renew many old
acquaintances.
-K.E.T.

Journal Editors

Dean Gamin, right, is editor-in-chief of the
Law Review, following in the footsteps of
his brother Mark, '83, now an associate with
the Cleveland firm of Thompson, Hine &
Flory. (The photographer caught them
together at the Law Review banquet last
April.) Dean is a 1984 graduate of Kent
State University, where he majored in
telecommunications, concentrating in
business. He spent the summer in Cleveland,
his hometown, working for the firm of
Cavitch, Familo & Durkin, and burning
midnight oil in the Law Review office.

Mitzi Cole, editor in chief and Leon
Davidoff executive editor, head the staff of
Health Matrix this year. Cole is from Exton,
Pennsylvania; she is a licensed pharmacist,
with a B.S. degree from the Philadelphia
College of Pharmacy and Science. She was
back in Philadelphia last summer, working as
a law clerk at Wyeth Laboratories, a division
of the American Home Products Corporation,
Davidoff's home is Newington, Connecticut.
He is a graduate of Clark University
(Worcester, Massachusetts), where he doublemajored in government and economics.

The Law Review's managing editor is
Douglas Bell, a 1980 Haverford College
graduate (major: economics) who spent four
years with Cleveland's National City Bank as
an investment officer before entering
CWRU's J.D./M.B.A. program. He was in
Cleveland during the summer, at Jones, Day,
Reavis & Pogue. Bell and his wife are both
Clevelanders; she is the daughter of
Morton L. Stone, '54.

Christopher Bauman, editor in chief of the journal of International Law, was born and raised
in Caracas, Venezuela; his father worked for an American oil company there. A wide-ranging
recruiter for the College of Wooster brought him to Ohio; he received his B.A. degree in
philosophy in 1982. Bauman spent the past summer in New York with Grant, Herrmann,
Schwartz & Klinger, a small firm specializing in international—especially Latin American—law.
Renee Chudakoff is editor-in-chief of the Canada-United States Law Journal. A Clevelander,
Chudakoff stayed home last summer and worked in the city prosecutor's office. She is a 1983
graduate of Ohio State University; English was her major there.
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What We Learned from the
Alumni Directory
by Kerstin E. Trawick
Director of Publications & External Affairs

We're delighted to report that the
1986 Law Alumni Directory has been
generally well received. For us at the
Law School it was, as they say, a
learning experience.
It was not the nearly effortless
project that we had imagined. Exactly
3,367 of our graduates—nearly 60
percent of the total—returned the
directory forms, and many hundreds
of person-hours went into entering
the new data. Our hard-working
computer generated the book—with a
little human coaxing—and saved us
(by the printer's estimate) 54 persondays of typesetting. But we still had
to edit. Some graduates wanted their
home addresses or phone numbers
omitted; others wished not to appear
in the directory at all. And even a
quick proof-reading found misspell
ings here and there. What we had
imagined as a minimal editing chore
turned into many hours of red ink.
We learned (but we had suspected
this earlier) that we're not perfect. In
the listing by class year we left out
1904. In the listing by state we left
out Indiana. One graduate who did
not want to be in the directory found
himself included there, and to him
we apologize. At least two persons
marked as deceased—Robert S.
Fulton, '72, and Jay R. Slobey '76are very much alive. Again, our sin
cere apologies. The other errors
we've discovered so far have been
less glaring. And we are still welcom
ing corrections.

The directory was a learning expe
rience in another way: it gave us a
reason to look at the distribution of
the Law School's graduates. In the
geographic section we sorted alumni
by business address, or by residence
if we had only a home address.
The accompanying map shows you
at a glance which states have the
greatest numbers. To no one's sur
prise, Ohio is way at the top with
3,293, or 59 percent of the total.
The state of New York is a distant
second place with 311. Five other
states (not counting Ohio) and the
District of Columbia have more than
a hundred. Another ten states have
fewer than a hundred but more than
thirty.
Three states—Montana, North
Dakota, South Dakota—have none at
all. Imagine that vast, desolate space,
absolutely void of CWRU law
alumni!
A count strictly by state doesn't do
justice to the two biggest concentra
tions of Law School graduates. There
are 320 alumni in and around New
York city (counting in southern Con
necticut and northern New Jersey).
And if you add northern Virginia and
Washington's Maryland suburbs to
the D.C. count, you get a D.C.-envi
rons total of 298.
The whopping number of alumni in
Ohio prompted us to take some
counts of alumni of different vintages
and compare the Ohio percentages.
Of the 1,649 alumni who graduated

in 1960 or earlier, 1,174—or 71 per
cent-are in Ohio. Graduates from
1961 on are a much bigger group—
3,978. Of these, only 54 percent are
in Ohio.
Looking more closely at graduates
of the past 25 years, we found out
that 56 percent of the 1961-76 classes
are in Ohio, compared with only 52
percent of the 1977-86 group. How
ever, the trend just may be reversing.
Of 1977-81 graduates, 50.4 percent
are in Ohio, but the percentage for
1982-86 is slightly higher: 51.9.
That's interesting to us, because we
know that more of our students in
recent years have come to the school
from outside of Ohio. Apparently
many of those supposedly-temporary
immigrants into the state decide that
Ohio looks like a pretty good place to
settle.

The alumni directory was
mailed at no charge to every
graduate on the school’s mailing
list, in most cases to the home
address. Anyone who failed to
receive it can request a copy
from the Office of External
Affairs, which has a limited
supply of leftovers.

Massachusetts
101
Rhode Island 34
Connecticut 65

District of Columbia
Maryland
^35
58
West Virginia
8
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Alaska

6

Hawaii

14

University Alumni Census
The Alumni Development Office of
Case Western Reserve University is
planning a census of all the univer
sity's graduates, and of course that
includes law graduates. Census forms
will be mailed in February.
This may strike you as unnecessary
duplication, since the Law School just
completed a directory project, but we
assure you that we welcome every

opportunity to update our address
data. The university alumni office
will share new information with us.
Furthermore, the university's cen
sus form includes much more than
address information. It asks for infor
mation about spouse and children;
past and present employment and
affiliations; degrees received from
institutions other than CWRU; stu

dent activities and alumni activities;
income (this section is optional, of
course]; and attitudes and interests.
When the census is completed,
we'll know a great deal more about
our alumni population. We hope as a
result to serve you better. And we
really mean that.

Visitors to the Law School

On October 21 the Eighth District Ohio
Court of Appeals held sessions at Gund Hall.
Joseph Nahra, Blanche Krupansky, '48, and
Richard Markus, the district's chiefjudge,
were the panel.

E. C. Ubaezonu, associate justice of the High
Court of Nigeria, visited the Law School in
September and addressed a faculty gathering,
describing the Nigerian judicial system. Judge
Ubaezonu received his legal training in
England at the Bristol University College of
Law, clerked for Lord Wigoder of the British
High Court in London, and practiced law in
Nigeria for more than twenty years before his
appointment to the bench.

An October visit by Judge R. Eugene
Pincham of the Illinois Appellate Court was
co-sponsored by the Student Bar Association
and the Black Law Students Association.
Judge Pincham addressed the Academy fhis
topic: "In Spite of the Judges—Why the
Adversary System Works"I, met informally
with students, and visited classes of his old
friend Professor James McElhaney. The judge
and his wife are shown here with McElhaney
and Hewitt Smith, BLSA president.

James M. Stephens, '71, labor counsel to the
National Labor Relations Board, addressed
the Academy last fall. He talked about the
role of politics in the selection and service of
NLRB members.

The Stockdale brothers were the youngest
participants in the annual Parents' and
Partners' Day on October 18.

William F. Nelson, chief counsel of the
Internal Revenue Service, visited the school
in November as the Norman A. Sugarman
Tax Lecturer. He is with Joan Sugarman,
whose late husband (a 1940 graduate)
established the lectureship.
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Alumni Annual Fund
We Need Your Help!
by Fred Weisman, '51
Chairman, Alumni Annual Fund

We set an ambitious goal for the
1986-87 Law Alumni Annual Fund—
$375,000—and we've made a good
start toward achieving it. As of
December 1 cash contributions
totaled $108,265, or 29 percent. An
additional $139,622 has been
pledged. I'm happy to report that
many donors are making significant
increases over their last year's gifts.
$117,672 of the pledge total is the
result of three nights of telethon in
October. Led by a triumvirate—tele
thon co-chairs Colleen Conway
Cooney, '81; Michael Drain, '70; and
Mary Anne Garvey, '80—48 alumni
volunteers, reinforced by 21 students
and staff, made contact with 1,169
Law School graduates.
Three more nights of telethon are
scheduled for February. WE NEED
VOLUNTEERS! The number of fall
telethon volunteers was down from
the year before, and several classes
were not represented at all. This
means that much, much more is still
to be done! If you can help, call our
Annual Fund coordinator, Janet Scott,
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at 368-6355. You'll have a lot of fun,
plus the satisfaction of helping a good
cause.
If you are among the 4,000 alumni
who have not yet made a gift to the
1987 fund, please remember that the
Law School and its students depend
on you. Your gift of any amount is
deeply appreciated. Checks payable
to Case Western Reserve University
can be sent to Janet Scott's attention
at the Law School, 11075 East Boule
vard, Cleveland, Ohio 44106.
As an extra incentive to your gener
osity we're promising an Official
CWRU Law Suit T-shirt to 1) every
first-time donor of $30 or more, 2)

everyone who joins a donor club for
the first time, and 3) everyone who
moves up from one club to another.
And remember that the donor clubs
receive special recognition in the
annual Report of Giving and in Gund
Hall's upper rotunda. (If you have
not seen the handsome Donor Club
Register, you should drop by the
school and take a look at it.)
Here are the minimum contribu
tions for donor club memberships:
President's Society—$5,000
Dean's Fellow—$2,500
Dean Andrews Club—$1,500
Dean Hopkins Club—$1,000
Dean Dunmore Club—$500
Century Club—$100 (open only to
the 1982-86 classes)

If you have already contributed to
the 1987 Alumni Annual Fund,
thanks a million! And many, many
thanks to our class agents and to all
those who have helped—or who will
help!

New Endowment Funds

Anniversary
Class Gifts

Two new endowment funds have
been begun in recent weeks, and
both are well on the way to the
$10,000 that will qualify them for
formal establishment by the Case
Western Reserve University Board of
Trustees.
One fund, which will benefit the
Law School's Center for Criminal
Justice, is named in honor of Dr.
Samuel R. Gerber, Cuyahoga County
coroner, who has completed an aston
ishing fifty years in elective office.
An emeritus member of the univer
sity's medical faculty, Gerber was one
of the founders—with Dr. Alan
Moritz and Professor Oliver Schroeder—of the Law-Medicine Center.
Schroeder and Judges Harry Jaffe,
'33, and Francis Talty, '46, organized
this tribute to Gerber arui raised (as
of December 1) $12,965 for the
Samuel R. Gerber Endowment Fund.
The other fund was the happy
inspiration of Lois Weisman, who
threw a bang-up surprise birthday
party for her husband Fred ('51) and
suggested to his friends and col
leagues that the best birthday present
would be a gift in his honor to the
Case Western Reserve Law School.

Three of the 1987 reunion classes
have special campaigns under way to
raise a significant anniversary gift.
These are the classes celebrating 10,
25, and 50 years since graduation:
the classes of 1977, 1962, and 1937.
Their class agents for the Alumni
Annual Fund also chair the anniver
sary gift campaigns: William R. Van
Aken, '37; Ivan L. Otto, '62; and, for
the class of 1977, James A. Clark and
Beverly J. Coen.
Gifts to the 1986-87 Annual Fund
will count as part of the Anniversary
Class Gift, and so will gifts or pledges
to the 1987-88 fund which are
received before December 31, 1987.
Furthermore, the anniversary gift
will include contributions to endow
ment funds, special-purpose gifts,
new or increased will commitments,
life-income trusts—in short, virtually
all donations and commitments
within the 18-month period from July
1, 1986, to December 31, 1987.
The anniversary chairmen hope
that when each class convenes at the
1987 Alumni Weekend, on Saturday,
September 19, they will have a really
impressive dollar figure to announce
to the reunion revelers.

The Fred Weisman Endowment Fund
will be designated for student schol
arships.
Speaking for the Law School, Dean
Peter Gerhart commented: "Honor
endowment funds like these are a
splendid way for alumni and friends
to commemorate the accomplish
ments of distinguished individuals
while contributing to our ability to
train students to be persons of
accomplishment for the future. They
are important adjuncts to the Annual
Fund because they give us an occa»
sion to appreciate the distinguished
past of our alumni and friends while
building for the future."

CLE News
by Kenneth R. Margolis, '76
Director of Continuing Legal Education

FALL 1985

FALL 1986

Liability of Insurance Agents, Brokers,
and Other Intermediaries
Wilbur C. Leatherberry...........................................$15
Fifty New Evidence Decisions
Richard M. Markus................................................. $40

Handling the Products Liability Case

Harry Philo, Robert E. Sweeney, James A. Lowe,
John L. Herron, Mark McCarthy,
and R. Eric Kennedy..................................................$25

Anatomy of a 1983 Action Abraham Cantor,

As you have probably noticed, over
the last year and a half the Law
School's Department of Continuing
Legal Education has made a renewed
effort to bring you valuable and inter
esting courses to sharpen your law
yering skills, keep you abreast of the
latest developments in your field, and
help you expand your practice into
new areas. We are constantly on the
lookout for timely topics, and we
welcome feedback about the courses
we have given. You, the alumni, have
a role to play in the direction of the
CLE program. Please let us have your
comments and suggestions.
Response to our courses has been
so favorable that we hope to increase
our offerings and to offer videotapes
of particularly effective seminars.
Even now we can offer some excel
lent course materials. Please see the
list of materials available. We are
now planning the spring program,
and you should receive information
around the first of February. If you
find courses of interest to you, please
register without delay. We can plan
more effectively if we know well in
advance how many will participate.
Thank you for making the CLE
program such a great success. We
hope to see you at the spring semi
nars!

Class Notes
by Amy Ziegelbaum
A

1928
Willis L. Hotchkiss has
published The Hotchkiss Luck:
An Autobiography, 1901-1928.
Now retired and living in
Toronto, Hotchkiss was a
celebrated antitrust attorney
for 26 years: he also travelled
widely around the world.
Since the book covers the early
part of his life, it includes
quite a bit about his studies at
Western Reserve Law School.

Terry H. Gilbert, Barbara Rook Snyder,
and Eric Zagrans........................................................ $40

How to Handle a Drunk Driving Case

Alec Berezin............................................................... $35
Basic Estate Planning LeslieL. Knowlton . $40
Representing the Health Care Professional

Medical Malpractice: A TVial Seminar
Update Fred Weisman...........................................$25

Michael P Coyne, Richard S. Cooper, and
Richard A. Naegele....................................................$25

SPRING 1986

Recent Developments in Ohio Appellate
Procedure Richard M. Markus........................ $40
How to Manage a Law Practice
Avery H. Fromet........................................................ $25

Toxic Tort Litigation: The New Frontier
Peter H. Weinberger................................................. $35
Fifty New Civil Procedure Decisions
Richard M. Markus................................................. $40
Wrongful Discharge: A Trap for the
Unwary Employer Keith Ashmus and
Richard G. Ross........................................................ $30
Private Remedies and Consumer
Protection Ric Sheffield and Spencer Neth . . $25

Anatomy of a Libel Action Brent L. English
and Richard D. Panza............................................. $35

Note:
Prices are subject to change without notice.

Order Form for Course Manuals
PLEASE PRINT:

. Telephone i

Name______

. Suite # .

Address .
City/State/Zip .
PLEASE SEND ME THE FOLLOWING ITEMS:
QUANTITY
DESCRIPTION

PRICE

TOTAL

1)-------------------------------------------------2)--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

3|----------------------------------------------------TOTAL ENCLOSED: $
Checks should be made payable to CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY
Orders will not be processed without payment
Please allow 4-6 weeks for delivery
D RUSH-add 10% to purchase price. Delivery within 10 days.
Return this form to: Department of Continuing Legal Education, Case Western Reserve
University School of Law, 11075 East Boulevard, Cleveland, Ohio 44106.

1933
Benjamin Reich was

1937
Of course the 1987 Law

recently elected commander of
the Lyndhurst UFW post; he
also has recently completed a
course in philosophy at
Hiram's Weekend College—
"much to my regret—I didn't
understand a bit of it!"

Alumni Weekend will include
a grand 50-year reunion dinner
for the Class of 1937 on Satur
day, September 19. Bill Van
Aken, Elliott Hannon, Bill
Victor, and Adrian Miller
have already said they would
join in the planning of this
event. Anyone else who would
like to help should get in touch
with one of them or with the
Law School's director of exter
nal affairs, Kerstin Trawick.

1934
Karl Krastin, dean emeritus
of the University of Toledo
College of Law (and now
professor of law at Nova Uni
versity), was recently honored
by the Toledo Law Alumni
Association at its annual gath
ering.

William H. Victor, former
Ohio ninth district appeals
judge, was the recipient of the
University of Akron Law
School's Dean's Club Award.

1942

Anyone who would like to
help in planning a 45-year
reunion for the Class of 1942
should get in touch with Ker
stin Trawick, the Law School's
director of external affairs, or
with one of the class members
who have already indicated
their interest: Dan Belden,
John Conway, Joe Lom
bardo, Phil Hermann. The
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date of the party will be Satur
day, September 19.

1947
Bruce Griswold, Hal
Newell, Ev Krueger, Jack
Hecker, and Bob McCreary
have begun the planning for a
40-year class reunion on Satur
day, September 19, in conjunc
tion with the 1987 Alumni
Weekend, and they would be
happy to hear from any class
mate who would like to help.
Or you can call Kerstin Trawick, the school's director of
external affairs.

1948
U.S. District Judge Alvin I.
Krenzier was honored by
Cleveland State University for
his major donation to the
university's soccer field. The
facility has been named in his
honor.

1950

Thomas O. Matia received
the Ohio Supreme Court's
Excellent Judicial Award, along
with CWRU Law graduates
William E. Aurelius, '55, and
Richard J. McMonagle, '67.
Milton D. Holmes and
George W. Spanagel were the
recipients of the Supreme
Court's Superior Award, along
with 1951 graduate Robert J.

Grogan.

1951

Alvin L. Gray, senior part
ner with Gray, Luria & Belkin,
was named the 1986 Man of
the Year by the Cleveland
Men's OR’T Federation. ORT—
the Organization for Rehabili
tation through Training—has
honored Gray for his contribu
tions to the Jewish community.
For Robert J. Grogan, see

1950.
R. William Rosenfeld
writes that he is living in
California, where he is a clini
cal social worker in the Cancer
Research Institute and Hema
tology/Oncology Service of the
University of California Medi
cal Center, San Francisco.

1952
The Class of 1952 will cele
brate its 35th anniversary at
the Alumni Weekend, Satur
day, September 19. Allan

Kleinman, Joe Cook, Dan
Ekelman, Bill Warren, Dick
Sternberg, and Warren Gib
son have already signed on
the planning committee, and
others are welcome to join
them: call one of the above, or
call the school's director of
external affairs, Kerstin Trawick.
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1955
For William E. Aurelius,

1968
Martin A. Fishman, for

1974
Glenn G. Galbreath, for

see 1950.

merly with Burke, Haber &
Berick, is now vice president
and general counsel for the
Associated Estates Corpora
tion, Cleveland.

merly deputy director for
litigation with Advocates for
Basic Legal Equality in Toledo,
has moved to Ithaca, New
York, where he is teaching in
the civil law clinic at Cornell
Law School.

1957
This year marks the 30th
anniversary, and Ron Ruben-

stein, Stan Gottsegen, Ray
Griffiths, Joe Schneider, and
Chuck Stack have begun to
plan a party for June or Sep
tember. Anyone else who
would like to help should get
in touch with one of them or
with Kerstin Trawick at the
Law School.

Ronald M. Rubenstein,
managing partner of Sindell &
Rubenstein, was recently
sworn in as president of the
Cuyahoga County Bar Associa
tion.

1960
Robert M. Lustig has been
elected president of the City
Club of Cleveland. Lustig
practices with Lustig, Icove &
Lustig.

1962

The Class of 1962 marks 25
years in 1987 and—yes—there
will be a reunion. The date is
Saturday, September 19. Dan
Clancy, the Law School's vice
dean, tells us that he and Ivan
Otto and Fred Lombardi
have already begun to lay
some plans, and they need a
few more volunteers for a
committee.

Marc and Judith Meshorer,
'69, have coauthored a book
entitled Ultimate Pleasure: The
Secrets of Easily Orgasmic
Women, published by St. Mar
tin's Press. Playboy has run
excerpts in two issues; New
Woman has bought excerpt
rights, and the Book-of-theMonth Club made the volume
an alternate selection this past
fall. The Meshorers live in
Cleveland: Judith is a partner
with Bialosky, Abel &
Meshorer.

1967
Jerry Chattman has
recruited several other class
mates to help in planning a 20year reunion on Saturday,
September 19: Owen Heggs,

Garry Schwartz, Lloyd
Mazur, George Sadd, Dan
Lovinter, Dick McMonagle,
Joe Valentino, Mike Ritz,
Marian Ratnoff, Mark
Schwartz, Leonard Wolkov.
More volunteers would be
welcome: call Jerry Chattman,
or call Kerstin Trawick at the
Law School.
For Richard J. McMonagle,
see 1950.

1969
For Judith Meshorer, see
1962.

1971
C. Ruth Sorensen is now
the Modoc County district
attorney in Alturas, California.

1972
The Alumni Weekend in
September (Saturday, the 19th)
will include a 15-year celebra
tion for the Class of 1972. Lee

Koiczun, Rick Bamberger,
Gary Andrachik, Bob Rapp,
Chuck Zellmer, Chuck
Guerrier, and Diane Rubin
Williams have signed on the
planning committee, and they
invite others to join them. Call
any one of them, or call
Kerstin Trawick at the Law
School.

Norton Gordon writes from
Miami Beach that he has been
nominated for the Case
Reserve Athletic Club Hall of
Fame: he was an undergradu
ate wrestler.
Edward H. Tetelman, a
lawyer with the Division of
Public Interest Advocacy in
the New Jersey Department of
the Advocate, was named
assistant commissioner for
inter-governmental affairs of
the New Jersey Department of
Human Services.

1973
Jeffrey H. Friedman has
become a member of the
Cuyahoga County Bar Associa
tion Board of Trustees and the
Board of Trustees for Goodwill
Industries.

Michael K. Magness, for
merly executive director of
Martindale Services and direc
tor of placement services for
New York University Law
School, has formed the man
agement consulting firm of
Magness & Wehmann in New
Yor^.
Jeffrey N. Silverstein has
joined the Marathon Develop
ment Corporation in Burke,
Virginia; he was formerly with
the firm of Baumann & Silver
stein,
Stephen D. Webster is now
associated with Woodward &
Griffiths in Chagrin Falls; he
was previously with Webster,
Morhard & Koach in Cleve
land.

Stephanie Tiibbs Jones has
been appointed to the board of
the Cleveland Public Library
for a seven-year term.

1976
Roger L. Shumaker spoke
to the Tax Section at the
annual ABA meeting on
"Using Micro Computers in
Estate Planning" and served as
a moderator and panelist on a
Probate and Trust Division
program on "Computerized
Planning and Probate—Demon
stration and Examples." He
also spoke recently at the
Notre Dame annual Tax and
Estate Planning Institute.

1977
The Class of 1977 is plan
ning a 10-year reunion in
conjunction with the Alumni
Weekend, Saturday, September
19. So far the committee con
sists of David Benjamin,

Fran Goins, Peter Joy, Bev
Coen, Jim Clark, Sandy
Hunter, Chevene King,
Chuck Whitney, Patty Hol
land, Mark Holbert, Steve
Thomas, Bob Reffner,
Wayne Marta, John Sopko.
Others are welcome to join
and can call any committee
member or Kerstin Trawick at
the Law School.

Mark M. Biars has been
promoted to vice president and
senior lawyer in the law
department of National City
Bank, Cleveland.
David I. Hammond moved
from the Cleveland office of
Arter & Hadden to the Dallas
office of Arter, Hadden &
Witts, where he was made a
partner.
David L. Huber was made
a partner in White & Case,
New York.
Marvin L. Weinberg, who
was with the National Labor
^ Relations Board for nine years,
has joined the labor depart
ment of the Philadelphia law
firm of Fox, Rothschild,
O'Brien & Frankel.

1978
A. John Hauschulz was
elected as a principal in the
Cleveland office of Peat
Marwick & Mitchell; Haus
chulz specializes in executive
compensation and employee
benefits in the management
consulting department.

Charles R. Kowal was
made a partner in Ernst &
Whinney, Cleveland.

1979
After three years with the
Tax Court in Washington,
D.C., Barbara F. Chalfant
has joined Strauss & Troy in
Cincinnati.

Robert A. Fuerst has joined
Kohrman, Jackson & Krantz in
Cleveland; he specializes in
real estate law.

Edison Hall and Kenneth
J. Freeman, '81, have formed
a partnership. Hall & Freeman,
with offices in Cleveland.

Ann K. Stevens writes from
Tampa: "After four and a half
years with the Traveler's
Insurance Company, I have
moved to the law firm of Lyle
& Skipper, PA. As an associate
here, I am doing insurance
litigation. I am enjoying the
transition from the corporate
world to the firm world."

1980
Kendrew H. Colton has
become a member of
Cushman, Darby & Cushman
in Washington, D.C.

Eunice Bickel Hester is the
manager of the editorial
research department at BanksBaldwin Law Publishing Com
pany, Hester had been on In
Briefs Missing Persons list,
and we are glad to have found
her!
David C. Vanaman, for
merly assistant general counsel
for the Fru-Con Corporation in
Ballwin, Missouri, has joined
the Sverdrup Corporation in
St. Louis.
C. David Zoba has joined
Arter, Hadden & Witts in
Dallas as a real estate partner,
^ba practiced for four years
with Cravath, Swaine & Moore
in New York, and more
recently he was with the
Herring Marathon Group, Inc.,
a major Dallas-based shopping
mall developer.

■1981
Brian K. Brittain, who
practices in the labor law
department of Wickens, Herzer & Panza in Cleveland,
received a Master of Business
Administration degree in
management and labor rela
tions from the James J. Nance
College of Business of Cleve
land State University.

John A. Collins III was
made a partner in the New
London, Connecticut, firm of
Suisman, Shapiro, Wool, Bren
nan & Gray.

Mary T. (Rzewnicki) Cush
ing has moved from the Midland-Ross Corporation to the
LTV Steel Company in Cleve
land.

For Kenneth J. Freeman,
see 1979.

Michael L. Malkin writes
from Girard, Ohio: "Was a law
clerk to several judges: then
was legal counsel to ELTECH
Systems Corporation for 2-1/2
years: recently became legal
counsel to Easco Aluminum
Corporation . . . responsible for
the pension and thrift plans,
all insurance matters, leasing,
employee benefits, and other
legal and administrative func
tions."
Scott M. Watson, formerly
with Naval Legal Services in
Millington, Tennessee, is now
with the firm of Reese,
McNenny Pyle & Drake in
Newark, Ohio.

1982
The Class of 1982 will gather
at Alumni Weekend (Saturday,
September 19| for its first
reunion, celebrating five years.
Anyone who would like to
help in the planning should
call the school's Office of
External Affairs or one of the
classmates who have already
signed on the committee: Tom

Cawley, Cynthia Smith,
Dave Green, Liz Barker
Brandt, Stacy Smith Quinn,
Kathy Lazar, Jon and Judy
Colenback Savage, or Andre
Craig.
Michael O. Adelman has
accepted a position with Shanley & Fisher in Morristown,
New Jersey; he was formerly
with the New York firm of
Carb, Luria, Glassner, Cook &
Kufeld.

Sheryl A. DeSantis writes:
"I was appointed municipal
judge of the Borough of Bound
Brook in Somerset County,
New Jersey. I am the first
woman to be appointed as a
municipal judge in Somerset
County. I also started my own
law firm in Bridgewater, New
Jersey."
David Clark Worley has
joined the New York firm of
Cadwalader, Wickersham &
Taft, following a year and a
half with Jones, Day, Reavis &
Pogue in Los Angeles.

1984
Kenneth J. Borg is now the
research attorney for the
Municipal and Superior Courts
in El Cajon, California. He was
previously with the law offices
of Lionel P. Hernholm in San
Diego.

Betsy A. Breese and John
E. Schiller have married and

have moved back to Cleve
land. Breese, who was with
Cravath, Swaine & Moore in
New York, is now with Baker
& Hostetler: Schiller was with
the State Employment Rela
tions Board in Columbus and
is now with Young, Kaufman
& Cumberland.

Scott Douglas Porter has
moved from Morris & McVeigh
to Kaplan Russin Vecchi &
Kirkwood, New York.
Jane I. Rolnick has
accepted a position in the
corporate law department of
Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan
& Aronoff in Cleveland.
Rolnick had been with Thomp
son, Hine & Flory since gradu
ating.

1985
Lawrence Paul Hampton
is now with Chamberlain,
Hrdlicka, White, Johnson &
Williams in Houston. His
article, "The Continuing
Debate over Recoverability of
the Costs of Child-Rearing in
Wrongful Conception Cases:
Searching for Appropriate
Judicial Guidelines," appeared
in the ABA's Family Law Quar
terly, vol. 20, Spring 1986.

Kenneth D. Johnson has
moved to Irvine, California,
where he is with the firm of
Allen, Matkins, Leek, Gamble
& Mallory.
Jeffrey W. Krueger, for
merly with the Ohio Bureau of
Taxation in Columbus, has
joined the Cleveland offices of
Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue.
Michael R. Spreng has
joined Porter, Wright, Morris &
Arthur in Cleveland; he had
been working with the Dallas
firm of Evans, Loshinsky &
Zoba.

Frederic M. Wilf writes, "I
have associated with the law
firm of Elman Associates,
which practices high technol
ogy law in Philadelphia. I will
be practicing in the areas of
computer software licensing
and litigation, business and
corporate law including the
starting-up of high technology
companies."

1986
The last In Brief reported on
jobs as of August 1, 1986. The
following have been reported
since then:
Brian S. Belson
Camden Regional Legal
Services

Camden, New Jersey
Mark D. Euster

Stephen Kutenplon
Bernkopf, Goodman &
Baseman

Boston, Massachusetts
Michael R. Maiman
Benefits Review Board
U.S. Department of Labor

Washington, D C.
David G. Meany
Fahrenkopf Mortimer
Sourwine Mousel & Sloane

Reno, Nevada
Inese A. Neiders
solo practice

Columbus, Ohio
Rebecca Anne Rea
White, Milano & Miller

Cleveland, Ohio
Lynn Disney Sivinski
Rubin Guttman Co., L.P.A.

Cleveland, Ohio
Cheryl M. Tyson
Environmental Protection
Agency

Dallas, Texas

IN MEMORIAM
John W. Barkley, ’14-

Society of Benchers
September 28, 1986
Ruben H. Sacharow, '23

October 3, 1986
Leonard Danaceau, '24

October 13, 1986
Dennis W. Palmquist, '28

November 14, 1986
Sanford Schwartz, '30

September 9, 1986
Gerald E. Johnson, '32

September 16, 1986
Donald W. Lentz, '35

November 22, 1986
Clayton J. Oberholtzer, '39

October 6, 1986
George S. Warner, '40

August 21, 1986
George A. Costello, '44

August 27, 1986
Barbara E. Gorman, '48

September 16, 1986
Thomas J. Miller, '61

November 9, 1986
Dale T. Evans, '64

September 17, 1985
Patricia Jones Anderson, '65

November 16, 1986
Paul Michael Cadden, '83

May 11, 1986

Zion, Tarleton & Siskin

Decatur, Georgia
Arl H. Jaffe
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Ohio

Cleveland, Ohio
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Missing Persons
This list of "lost” alumni—persons for whom we have
no current mailing address—is longer than in past is
sues of In Brief because in producing the Alumni Direc
tory we discovered that several graduates had never
made it into our computer system. A certain number of
these may be deceased; if you have such information,
please let us know.
We will appreciate any help you can give us in track
ing down our missing persons. Call (216/368-3860) or
write the Office of External Affairs, Case Western Re
serve University School of Law, 11075 East Boulevard,
Cleveland, Ohio 44106.
Class of 1937
George Ben Golden
Robert E. Sheehan
Beatrice Handy Ulrich
Class of 1938
Santo Dellaria
Francis J. Dowling
Paul Riffe
Class of 1939
Thomas J. McDonough
Theodore Thomas
Thorwald
Class of 1940
Norman Finley Reublin
Class of 1942
Peter H. Behrendt
William Bradford Martin
Class of 1943
David J. Winer
Class of 1945
Doris Birtic Adams
Class of 1946
Pericles J. Polyvios
Class of 1947
Robert H. Adler
George J. Dynda
Class of 1948
Hugh McVey Bailey
Walter Bernard Corley
Charles S. Doherty
Joseph Norman Frank
Kenneth E. Murphy
John Francis O'Brien
Frederick Carl Prasse
James L. Smith
Class of 1949
Coleman L. Lieber
Dallas Edward Riddle
Mary Nicholson Snyder
Class of 1950
Oliver Fiske Barrett
Marion T. Baughman
William Warren Bolin

Class of 1951
Robert L. Quigley
Donald Edward Ryan
Class of 1952
Anthony C. Caruso
Allan Arthur Riippa
Class of 1954
Owen Montague
Cornell, Jr.
Class of 1956
Edward R. Lawton
Ray James Roche
Class of 1957
Robert H. Cummins
Class of 1958
Leonard David Brown
Donald F. Smith
Class of 1961
James E. Meder
Thomas A. Parlette
Class of 1963
John R. Dwelle
Class of 1964
Frank M. VanAmeringen
Ronald E. Wilkinson
Class of 1965
Joseph J. Pietroski
Salvador y Salcedo
Tensuan
Class of 1966
Robert F. Gould
Gerald N. Mauk
Class of 1967
Joseph H. Downs
Thomas F. Girard
David Bruce Harrison
Donald J. Reino
George Michael Simmon
Class of 1968
Robert Stanley Wilson, Jr.
Class of 1969
Gary L. Cannon
Robert Sherwood Carles
George E. Harwin
Class of 1970
John F. Strong

Class of 1971
Christopher R. Conybeare
Michael D. Franke
David V. Irish
Class of 1972
Alex Gerhart Logan III
Class of 1973
Thomas A. Clark
Thomas D. Colbridge
Robert Dale Conkel
Class of 1974
Bruce Ira Haber
Douglas H. Kohrt
Kenard McDuffie
John W. Wiley
Class of 1976
A. Carl Maier
Class of 1977
Sherman L. Anderson
Lynn Sandra Golder
Maureen M. McCabe
Daniel V. Zemaitis
Class of 1978
Lenore M. J. Simon
Class of 1979
Elizabeth Kinchen Kozul
Gregory Allan McFadden
Class of 1980
Lewette A. Fielding
Shayne Tulsky Rosenfeld
Class of 1981
James Franklin Anadell
Peter Shane Burleigh
Luis A. Cabanillas, Jr.
Shippen Howe
Class of 1982
Stephen A. Watson
Class of 1983
Mary Victoria White
Class of 1984
Richard S. Starnes

Case Western Reserve
University
Law Alumni Association
Officers
President

Thomas A. Heffernan '64
Vice President

Patrick M. Zohn, '78
Regional Vice Presidents

James A. Clark, '77
Chicago, Illinois
Lee J. Dunn, Jr., '70
Boston, Massachusetts
Joseph M. Gray, Jr., '72
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
Dixon F. Miller, '76
Columbus, Ohio
Robert P. Reffner, '77
Akron, Ohio
John F. Sopko, '77
Washington, D.C.
James R. Strawn, '76
Canton, Ohio
Alexander and Mary Ann Zimmer, '75
New York, New York
Secretary

John S. Pyle, '74
Treasurer

Ivan L. Otto, '62
Board of Governors
Bruce Alexander, '39
Elyria, Ohio
Richard H. Bamberger, '72
Virginia S. Brown, '81
Lawrence J. Carlini, '73
J. Michael Drain, '70
William T. Drescher, '80
Los Angeles, California
Mary Anne Mullen Fox, '83
Washington, D.C.
John M. Gherlein, '80
E. Peter Harab, '74
New York, New York
Patricia M. Holland, '79
Kurt Karakul, '79
John J. Kelley, Jr., '60
Cincinnati, Ohio
Allan D. Kleinman, '52
Stuart A. Laven, '70
Ernest P. Mansour, '55
James W. McKee, '69
Patricia Mell, '78
Wilmington, Delaware
Leo M. Spellacy '59
Paula M. Taylor, '83
Indianapolis, Indiana
Ralph S. Tyler, '75
Jerry F. Whitmer, '60
Akron, Ohio
Charles W. Whitney, '77
Atlanta, Georgia
Diane Rubin Williams, '72
Perrysburg, Ohio
Bennett Yanowitz, '49

Calendar of Events
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January 6

Los Angeles Alumni Luncheon
Association of American Law Schools
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January 8
San Francisco Alumni Luncheon

January 23
Akron Alumni Luncheon

February 6
Canton Alumni Luncheon

February 7

!

Jessup Moot Court Team Night

February 12

Phlegm Snopes Basketball Tournament, Final Game

Youngstown Alumni Luncheon

February 23, 24, 25
Alumni Annual Fund Telethon

February 27

Faculty/Alumni Luncheon, Cleveland
Speaker: Professor Sidney I. Picker, Jr.
Ault Moot Court Competition, Final Round

March 6
Niagara Moot Court Team Night

March 27
Pittsburgh Alumni Luncheon

April 3
Dunmore Tournament, Final Round

*

R etu rn to R ichard

A. Boger.

D irector of Placem ent.

February 20

April 3 to 5

|

Canada-U.S. Conference.
Competition and Dispute Resolution in the North American Context

April 10

Faculty/Alumni Luncheon, Beachwood
Speaker: Professor James W. McElhaney

May 1

May 15
Ohio State Bar Association
Alumni Breakfast—Dayton

4

May 18
Commencement

June 12
Columbus Alumni Luncheon

■

September 18 and 19
Alumni Weekend—Class Reunions
I
For further information: Office of External Affairs
Case Western Reserve University
School of Law
11075 East Boulevard
Cleveland, Ohio 44106
216/368-3860
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R eturn to Susan E. Frankel, D irector of A dm ission,

West-of-Cleveland Alumni Luncheon—Elyria

